Deep Financial Integration and Volatility by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank Nick Bloom, Nicola Cetorelli, Philipp Harms, Jean Imbs, Jens Iversen, Jan De Loecker,
Eswar Prasad, Romain Ranciere, Jae Sim, Robert Vermeulen, seminar participants at the University
of Alberta, Boston College, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve Board, George Washington
University, University of Maryland, Geneva International Institute, University of Lausanne, Kyiv School
of Economics, University of Piraeus, University of Southern California, University of Virginia, University
of Zurich, and the World Bank as well as participants in the Fifth Annual CEPR Workshop on Global
Interdependence, the 2009 UCLA-DEGIT XIV Workshop, the 2009 Summer Meetings of Econometric
Society in Boston, the 7th INFINITI conference in International Economics and Finance in Dublin,
the 2009 Midwest Macro Meetings (International Trade), the Globalization Conference at Trinity College,
the 2009 NBER Universities Research Conference, the 2009 Spring Meeting of NBER-IFM group,
the 2009 NBER Summer Institute-Productivity group, and in the 2008 IEFS World Congress in Istanbul.
Essential parts of this paper were prepared while Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan was visiting the European
Central Bank as 2008 Duisenberg Fellow. She thanks the economists at the Bank for providing a stimulating
research environment. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan is also grateful for financial support from the Marie
Curie Actions of the 7th Framework Programme for the EU Enlargement. The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent Sørensen, and Vadym Volosovych. All rights reserved. Short
sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Deep Financial Integration and Volatility
Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent Sørensen, and Vadym Volosovych




We investigate the relationship between financial integration and output volatility at micro and macro
levels. Using a very large firm-level dataset from EU countries over time, we construct a measure
of "deep" financial integration at the regional level based on foreign ownership at the firm level. We
find a positive effect of foreign ownership on volatility of firms' outcomes. This effect survives aggregation
and carries over to regional output. Exploiting variation in the transposition dates of EU-wide legislation,
we find that high trust regions in countries who harmonized capital markets sooner have higher levels
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Macroeconomists increasingly recognize the importance of interactions between rm- and aggregate-
level outcomes; in particular, aggregate economic growth and volatility is tightly linked to hetero-
geneity of rm-level activity. Our objective here is to empirically investigate the relationship be-
tween nancial integration and output growth volatility at the rm level as well as at the aggregate
level.
Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and Wei (2009) conclude that there is no systematic relationship between
volatility and nancial integration at the country level. This may be due to dierences in institu-
tions, industrial structures, nancial markets, and/or macro policies but due to endogeneity and
small country samples, it is not possible to sort this out. Figure 1 illustrates this identication
challenge. The relationship between volatility, and nancial integration changes dramatically with
the sample of countries.1 The gure suggests there is no relation between volatility and nancial
integration in the largest sample of 25 EU countries. However, if we omit small, open, and volatile
countries, such as Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus, it seems there is a strong negative relation between
volatility and integration. If we focus on 15 long-standing EU countries, the relationship turns
positive.2
We employ a novel empirical approach. Starting from the micro level using direct observations
on foreign ownership over time we rst study the relation between foreign ownership and rm-level
volatility. Next, we \aggregate our way up" to regions within countries by 1) calculating a weighted
average of rm-level foreign ownership,3 which we call \deep" nancial integration, and 2) aggregate
the output of rms by region and calculate regional volatility. Aggregate results will be dierent
due to aggregation of ownership or due to aggregation of output. To explore this issue we aggregate
the data in several \steps." We rst regress the volatility of the typical rm; i.e., median volatility
in each region, on regional deep integration and, next, we regress volatility of regional aggregated
output on deep integration in order to explore if the relation between ownership and volatility
carries over to the aggregated data. Finally, we combine our rm-level dataset from AMADEUS
with macroeconomic (regional) data from Eurostat and regress volatility of region-level GDP per
1We use the standard deviation of GDP growth between 1995 and 2005 for volatility. Financial integration
measured as sum of foreign assets and liabilities divided by GDP and averaged over 1995{2005, using data from Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
2If one does a similar exercise using a larger sample of countries, including both developed world and emerging
markets, the results are equally unstable as shown by Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and Wei (2009).
3Our measure of nancial integration is based on rm-level foreign ownership and captures foreign direct investment
(FDI) and equity liabilities.
2capita on deep nancial integration.
This is the rst integrated investigation of the relationship between nance and volatility at
the micro and macro levels. Focusing on rms and regions within countries is important to solve
the identication problem that plagues cross-country studies. Using country-, industry-, and time-
xed eects (and their combinations) and focusing on rms allow us to investigate the aect of
foreign nance on rm-level volatility in isolation from the rst-order general equilibrium eects
that aect country-level data. Focusing on regions allows us to investigate whether aggregation
\averages away" rm-level patterns and help us to answer the question of whether there is an eect
of nancial integration on aggregate volatility.
Many micro-founded models suggest a positive relationship between nancial integration and
volatility at the rm level. Foreign investors may acquire domestic rms for two reasons: a)
\diversication" or b) \control." If investors buy stakes in rms for the purpose of diversication
we expect to nd a positive correlation between foreign ownership and rm-level volatility. Foreign
investors are likely to be better diversied against shocks to the domestic economy and therefore
more tolerant of domestic risk and more likely to invest in volatile rms.4 This implies volatility
aects foreign ownership but there may also be a causal eect of foreign ownership on volatility.
When a rm is more diversied the domestic majority owner is less impacted by the rm's volatility
and hence more willing to undertake high variance-high return investments. This argument is
detailed in Obstfeld (1994) who shows how diversied capital ownership allows rms to choose
riskier projects.5
Foreign rms may buy stakes in domestic rms for reasons of control; for example, to control
their supply chain, or to obtain competitive advantage, economies of scale, market access, etc. Such
multinational investors will typically hold majority stakes and therefore decide on the business
strategy of their target and they are likely to be better diversied against domestic risk than
domestic majority owners, because such investors often are rms with operations in their home
economy. They are therefore more willing to accept exposure to domestic risk. As a result volatility
will be positively correlated with foreign majority ownership with causation running from ownership
to volatility.
The predictions regarding aggregate volatility are ambiguous because the theoretical eects of
aggregation rests on a plethora of assumptions about rm heterogeneity, sectoral co-movements and
4We outline a model of such investors in Appendix C.
5Comin and Mulani (2009) develop a model where availability of nancing leads to more research and development,
causing rms to take on more risk; i.e., become more volatile.
3so forth.6 This ambiguity underlines the importance of studying nancial integration and output
volatility in a quantitative framework. Surprisingly, the empirical literature so far fails to deliver
a robust relationship|positive or negative|between nancial integration and volatility at either
the rm level7 or the aggregate level.8
We use rm-level accounting and ownership data from AMADEUS and region-level data from
Eurostat for the period 1996{2006. We focus on 15 EU countries and Switzerland, with 100+ regions
and 4.7 million unique rms (an unbalanced panel), in order to have a homogenous sample.9 Europe
provides an ideal \laboratory" because nancial integration there has dramatically increased cross-
country ownership over the last fteen years. Figure 2 displays foreign equity (FDI+portfolio)
and debt liabilities for the aggregate of our 16 countries during 1990{2006. The gure reveals a
better-than quadrupling of each liability component as a share of GDP. Foreign debt liabilities are
more than twice as large as equity liabilities but the rate of increase is higher for the latter leading
to a bigger increase in the share of equity as shown in the second panel.10
Most of the rm-level variation in our data is cross-sectional and we start by running cross-
sectional regressions. Next, we undertake a panel analysis using rm-xed eects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. We nd a signicant positive relation between foreign ownership and
rm-level volatility in both cross-sectional and in panel-xed eect frameworks. Firms with higher
levels of foreign ownership are more volatile and changes in foreign ownership over time are pos-
6See the literature survey in the next section. An additional concern is that nancial market integration within
countries may not be the same for dierent countries, as shown by Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Srensen (2009).
In this case, any analysis conducted at the country level, based on a representative agent framework, may not be
representative of typical agents or regions. It is important to separate the eects of within-country regional integration
from international nancial integration because international and intra-national integration may be complements or
substitutes. Recently Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007) emphasize the role of domestic nancial development
for determining patterns of external borrowing and lending.
7Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) nd an increase in rm-level volatility for listed French companies following nancial
deregulation, while Correa and Suarez (2007) nd less volatile rm-level sales and employment in a sample of listed
rms after bank deregulation in the United States.
8Bank deregulation dampened U.S. state-level business cycles; see Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004), while
increased nancial openness lead to increased volatility of both consumption and output at the country level; see
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003). Similarly, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) nd increased volatility of
output and consumption as a result of trade and nancial openness although equity-market liberalizations were
followed by a decrease in output and consumption volatility in some countries. di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009a),
using industry-level data, nd that nancial openness leads to an increase in aggregate volatility due to higher sectoral
specialization.
9For our 16 countries, AMADEUS lists a total of 9.9 million rms of which many have very limited data. 4.7 million
rms have at least one year with reported assets and an outcome variable|either sales, revenue, or employment.
Appendix Table B-1 lists the exact number of rms available by year and variable.
10Debt liabilities are non-contingent and hence will not be ideal for the purposes of risk diversication. Equity
liabilities are subject to large capital gains and losses which may explain the temporary decline after the \dot-com
bust" of the early years of the Millennium.
4itively associated with changes in volatility. The eect is economically signicant: if the largest
owner of a given rm is a foreign company, sales growth is 20 percent more volatile than the sample
mean. Volatility is also positively correlated with foreign minority ownership; however, the eect
is stronger for foreign ownership involving control, suggesting that this might be the channel of
causality.
The micro-level patterns carry over to the macro level and are robust to using our aggregation
or actual \macro-regional" data from Eurostat which provides validation of our methodology. The
macro-level estimates from the regional analysis are economically signicant. After removing the
eect of other regressors, the estimated coecient to nancial integration explain around 12 percent
of the variation in regional volatility.
To study causality, we undertake two exercises at the rm level. First, we use propensity
score matching methods to obtain a sample of domestic rms with no foreign ownership that are
observationally similar to the rms with foreign ownership. Combining these rms with our rms
with foreign ownership and repeating the regressions we obtain similar results. Second, we nd
that lagged foreign ownership predicts changes in volatility. While possibly such patterns could be
non-causal, the results are consistent with a causal eect of foreign ownership on volatility.
At the regional level, we obtain evidence of causality exploiting variation from the Financial
Services Action Plan of the EU (FSAP) launched in 1999 by the European Commission to integrate
EU nancial markets. The FSAP focuses on nancial services, securities regulation, and corporate
governance and was implemented during the following ve years. Each member state transposed
these policies into national laws at dierent times.11
We argue that country-level nancial harmonization policies eect regions dierently depending
on their level of social capital which we proxy by measures of trust obtained from responses in the
European Social Survey. These measures predict many nancial decisions according to Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2009)|of particular relevance is their 2004 nding that individuals
in high-trust regions are more likely to hold stock and their 2009 nding that savers invest in
countries that they trust. While these papers consider the side of investors, a similar pattern can
be expected when looking at the hosting economy. High social capital regions will likely to be more
receptive to foreign investments, especially because capital owners in these regions are themselves
11The coding of these EU-wide policies comes from Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydr o (forthcoming) who
nd a positive association between implemented harmonization policies and bilateral nancial integration of EU
countries.
5more diversied.12
We instrument time-varying regional nancial integration|based on weighted average of foreign
ownership|with regional trust interacted with country-wide nancial laws. We nd that a one-
standard-deviation change in the instrument (corresponding to three laws implemented in a region
with average trust) results in an increase in regional nancial integration of about 35 percent
while the second-stage estimates imply that nancial integration may explain about a third of the
variation in volatility across regions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes our data
and variable denitions. Section 4 discusses our empirical specication and presents our results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Aggregate Volatility: Literature
Higher rm-level volatility does not necessarily imply larger aggregate 
uctuations. Predicting
theoretically how micro-level volatility aects aggregate 
uctuations requires assumptions on the
patterns of correlation between the rm-level shocks. For example, in the Obstfeld (1994) model,
more risk-taking by rms will aect aggregate 
uctuations only if rm-level shocks are correlated
such that shocks do not average out.13 Kalemli-Ozcan, Srensen, and Yosha (2003) nd a positive
eect of risk sharing on industrial specialization using regional data. However, it is possible that
a higher level of sectoral specialization is associated with lower co-movement between sectors, as
argued by Koren and Tenreyro (2007). In this case specialization may lead to lower aggregate
volatility. Another mechanism that will create dependence between rm-level shocks is Caballero
and Engel (1999) where aggregate investment 
uctuations are born out by \lumpy" rm-level
investments with adjustment costs.14
If rm-level shocks are caused by independent rm-level innovations, on the other hand, the law-
12Another mechanism might be at work through the organizational structure of the rm as shown by Bloom, Sadun,
and Van Reenen (2009). They argue that areas with higher trust specialize in industries that rely on decentralization
allowing more ecient rms to grow in scale. It is plausible there will be more foreign investment in such areas as
well.
13An example could be a region where most activity is in a certain industry such as Alaska which is highly dependent
on oil. If the risk of oil-price shocks is shared with outsiders, more rms will be willing to undertake investments
in oil-related industries and if more rms are in the same (oil) industry aggregate (oil) shocks result in aggregate
volatility.
14Recently, Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009) propose that time-varying uncertainty combined with micro
rigidities can have important general equilibrium eects. If a change in foreign ownership leads to a change in
uncertainty across a rms this may in turn impact aggregate volatility.
6of-large numbers makes such shocks irrelevant in the aggregate assuming the economy consists of a
large number of small rms. The model of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) implies that integration
may lead to a larger number of smaller rms.15
Firm-level shocks may also carry over to the aggregate level if rm-sizes follow a power law, or
fat-tailed distribution. In this case, a few large rms can drive aggregate volatility as suggested by
Gabaix (2009).16
Finally, aggregate correlations between nancial integration and volatility may be determined
by how aggregate foreign capital 
ows respond to aggregate shocks. The multi-region extension of
the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model by Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) predicts, on the one
hand, a positive association between nancial integration and state business cycles if negative shocks
are associated with loss of collateral value of rms in a region. In this case, foreign lenders may
contract capital provision in bad times (and vice versa in good times), exacerbating 
uctuations. On
the other hand, if negative shocks aect the supply of credit while having little eect on collateral,
foreign lenders will supply scarce capital in times where local credit contracts cannot, smoothing

uctuations.
All said, the literature regarding aggregate shocks fails to deliver robust predictions and ndings
regarding the eect of nancial integration on volatility.17 We believe that in order to estimate
the eect of nancial integration on aggregate 
uctuations, one must rst pin down the eect of
foreign ownership on rm-level volatility.
3 Data and Construction of Variables
We construct a unique data set composed of rm-level observations from the AMADEUS database
(Analyze Major Databases from European Sources), provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Pub-
lishing (BvD), and region-level observations corresponding to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units
15Black and Strahan (2002), Kerr and Nanda (2007), and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) nd an increase in the
number of rms and a decrease in the average size of rms as a result of various nancial innovations.
16Gabaix provides evidence of fat-tailed distributions for the United States while di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009b)
nd evidence of fat tails using rm-level data from AMADEUS/ORBIS for several countries.
17The evidence on the co-evolution of the rm- and aggregate-level volatility is also mixed. There has been a
signicant decline in aggregate volatility in the United States and in most other industrial countries over the last
thirty years, (e.g., McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), and Stock and Watson (2003)). But ndings regarding U.S.
rm-level volatility during the same period are not conclusive: Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon (2002) nd increased
volatility of sales and employment while Davis and Kahn (2008) and Davis Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2007)
nd declining rm-level volatility.
7for Statistics of Europe (NUTS-2), provided by Eurostat. We focus on 16 countries: Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom which gives us a fairly homogenous sample.
The time coverage of each rm is a subset of the sample period 1996{2006, leading to an unbalanced
panel.
The AMADEUS database comes in two modules: AMADEUS Financials, which provides nan-
cial information|both balance-sheet and o-balance sheet items such as income statements and
prot and loss accounts|and AMADEUS Ownership, which provides information on foreign and
domestic owners of each rm. Data on ownership are available biennially since 2000. For each
rm, we have locational information which allows us to assign rm-level data from AMADEUS to
Eurostat's NUTS-2 level regions.
3.1 Firm-Level Data and Variables
From the AMADEUS Financials database, we draw rm-level information for 1996{2006 requiring
that rms have at least one of the three outcome variables non-missing (sales, operating revenue,
or employment) in a given year.18 We combine these data with data on foreign ownership from
the AMADEUS Ownership database, using rm IDs. During this process, we loose rms for which
data are not available in both samples, as documented in Appendix Table B-1.
We work with two types of samples. In the permanent rm sample over a specied period, say,
2000{2006, we keep all rms with outcomes non-missing in every year. In the sample of all rms,
we allow rms to have missing outcomes at the beginning or the end of any given regression sample
but we drop rms that have \holes" in the time-series. In other words, we allow rms to disappear
or appear; but not appear, disappear, and reappear.
Figure 3 presents the distribution, with the number of rms on the vertical axis, of the logarithm
of the rm-level operating revenue for four years and Figure 4 shows total assets and other outcomes
for 2006. Assets, sales, and operating revenue are measured in euros while employment is in persons.
The distribution of these (logged) variables does not change much over time and is very close to
normal; i.e., the distribution of the data before the log-transformation is very close to log-normal.
One noticeable thing is the skewed distribution of employment with many small rms with as
18While the Financials database reports nancial information over 1996{2008, the best rm coverage is for 2001{
2006. Delays in nancial reporting make the database incomplete for later years while earlier years have relatively
few rms.
8little as one employee (lawn mowers, painters, house repairs, etc.). To limit the potential impact
of outliers, we winsorize variables before performing our empirical analysis (Figure 4 displays the
distribution of assets both before and after winsorizing).
Volatility Measures
We calculate rm-level volatility using three dierent outcomes: rm sales, operating revenue,
and number of employees. Operating revenue is sales plus other revenues such as interest. For
robustness and comparability with previous work, we experiment with three dierent measures of
volatility. We follow the literature on rm-level volatility, which mostly focuses on large publicly
traded rms, and use the standard deviation of rm outcome growth (\sd") as our rst measure.19
The distributions of (winsorized) standard deviations of sales and operating revenue are displayed
in Figure 5. The distributions are fairly close to normal except for the pile-ups at the points of
winsorizing.
For small rms, measures based on standard deviations may have bad properties because, say,
a rm growing from 1 to 2 employees in a given year will have a growth rate of 100 percent and
such large growth rates some years but not in others will lead to correspondingly large standard
deviations. Because we have many small private rms, we use the coecient of variation (\cv")
as our second measure of volatility.
These measures are well-suited for cross-sectional analysis or for a panel analysis where there
are enough time-series observations to be able to calculate time-varying standard deviations (or
coecients of variation) over \rolling windows." Given our limited time-series dimension (ten years
of accounting data and only four years of ownership data), we construct a year-by-year volatility
measure that can be used for panel-data analysis. We follow Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004)
and construct a year-by-year measure of volatility as follows. First, we regress rm-level outcome
growth on rm-xed eects and year-xed eects:
Yit   Yit 1
Yit 1
= i + 
t + vit : (1)
The residuals vit re
ect how much outcome growth diers from average (across rms) growth in
year t and from the average (over time) growth of rm i. For each rm, we use the absolute value
of these residuals as our time-varying volatility measure: sdt  jvitj. Intuitively, the sdt measure
19We calculate rm outcome growth as a rate of change (rather than log-dierences since at the rm level, growth-
rates are so large that the usual logarithmic approximation sometimes is a bad approximation to the growth-rate.
9is the one year equivalent of the standard deviation measure, sd.20
Foreign Ownership
The AMADEUS Ownership database contains detailed information on rms' owners for both
listed and private rms including name, country of residence, and type (e.g., bank, industrial
or nancial company). The database refers to each record of ownership as an \ownership link"
and BvD traces a link between two entities even when the ownership percentage is very small
(sometimes less than 1 percent). For listed rms, very small stock holders are typically unknown.21
At the rm-level, we compute Foreign Ownership (FO) as follows. For a rm i, FOi is the sum of all
percentages of direct ownership by foreigners as reported in AMADEUS. For example, if a Company
A has three foreign owners with stakes 10 percent, 15 percent, and 35 percent, respectively, FO for
this company is 60 percent. Owners of unknown origin (typically small) are assigned to the home
country.
Figure 6 presents the distribution of foreign ownership for dierent years. The distribution is
concentrated around 0 with less than 1 percent of rms 100 percent foreign owned. In order to get
a clearer picture, Figure 7 presents the distribution of foreign ownership for the subset of rms with
strictly positive foreign ownership. There is a noticeable spike in the number of rms around 50
percent ownership which likely re
ects the desire of large investors to obtain a controlling interest
over 50 percent.
Other Measures of Ownership
We measure each rm's Foreign Minority Ownership (FMO) by computing the sum of all
percentages of foreign direct ownership after excluding the largest stake in the company; Domestic
Minority Ownership (DMO) is computed analogously, for domestic owners. If a Company A has
two foreign owners with stakes 50 percent and 15 percent, and two domestic owners with stakes
25 percent and 10 percent, the largest owner for this company is foreign (with stake 50 percent),
FMO is 15 percent, and DMO is 35 percent. We dene a binary variable Largest Owner is Foreign
20Using data from the ZEPHYR database, we dropped rms involved in a merger or acquisition when the merger
resulted in spuriously high growth for the acquirer. The number of rms involved in M&A activity as dened in
ZEPHYR is, however, a small fraction of our sample so our results do not depend on whether we drop such rms or
not.
21Countries have dierent rules for when the identity of a minority owner needs to be disclosed; for example, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden demand that listed rms disclose all owners with more than a ve percent
stake, while disclosure is required at three percent in the UK, and at two percent in Italy. See Schouten and Siems
(2009).
10(LOF) taking the value unity if the largest owner is foreign and zero otherwise.22
Figure 8 shows the distribution of foreign ownership for the sample of rms where the largest
owner is foreign. Not surprisingly, the majority of these rms have a foreign ownership share of
100 percent. Few of the rms have a foreign ownership share under 40 percent and there is a spike
around 50 percent.
Figure 9 presents the distribution of FMO and DMO in 2006. Most companies have a very small
degree of minority ownership and rms are more diversied domestically than internationally, an
observation that is consistent with the home bias literature. The upper right graph shows that
among all rms with non-zero foreign ownership, the amount of foreign minority ownership is
concentrated at ownership shares up to 20 percent. Domestic minority owners' share (DMO)
exhibits much more variation as can be seen from the lower right panel. Overall we have companies
with very diused ownership as can be detected from the histograms, where largest owner might
be owning 1.1 percent, and the rest 98.9 percent is all owned by minority owners.
Finally, we use the number of foreign and domestic owners, respectively, listed in AMADEUS as
alternative measures of ownership. The number of owners can also be thought as a concentration
measure.
Firm-Level Controls
We use rms' total assets as a size control because large rms potentially are better able to
smooth shocks through averaging of shocks to dierent products, processes, etc. We control for
rm age because young rms tend to be more volatile.
3.2 Region-Level Data and Variables
We use regional NUTS-2 level data for 100+ regions from our 16 countries. Countries with only
one NUTS-2 region during the years of our analysis, such as Denmark, are left out in the regional
analysis.
Regional Volatility Measures
We measure regional volatility in three ways. First, we use volatility of the median rm in the
region. Second, we aggregate rm-level outcomes to the regional level and calculate the volatility
22In the rare case of a tie between the largest foreign and the largest domestic investor, we assign the value 1 to
the LOF-dummy.
11of the aggregated outcomes. Third, we calculate regional volatility using data on regional output
from Eurostat. We use nominal GDP per capita in euros, de
ated by national CPI.23 Volatility is
calculated from formulas similar to those used at the rm level.
Deep Financial Integration
Our measure of deep nancial integration is calculated using rm-level measures of foreign own-
ership aggregated to the regional level. We have dierent rm-level foreign ownership variables, such
as total amount of foreign ownership (FO), largest-owner-is-foreign dummy (LOF), and foreign
minority ownership (FMO) and our regional equivalents|proxies for regional nancial integration
which we label FI, FI (majority), and FI (minority). For the domestic integration we use FI (do-






where FOij is the percentage foreign ownership at the rm-level for a rm i located in region j,
and wij represents the weight for rm i in region j. We nd the sum of total assets in region
j, TOASTj =
P
i TOASij, where TOASij is the total assets of company i and use as weights
wij = TOASij=TOASTj.
Figure 10 displays distributions of ownership for small, medium, and large rms for two regions,
Scotland and Bavaria (Bayern), in 2006. The upper panel displays the distribution of direct foreign
ownership FOi. In Bavaria about 30,000 rms have foreign ownership shares less than 20 percent|
of these more than 20,000 are small, about 5,000 are medium size, and the rest are large. The
majority of companies within each size group have no foreign owners. The mid-panel shows that
the share owned by the largest owner most commonly is 100 percent. The lower panel shows,
for Bavaria, the distribution of foreign and domestic minority ownership; i.e., when the ownership
share of the largest owner is excluded and it appears that foreign minority owners typically hold
very small stakes while the stakes of domestic minority owners are quite evenly distributed.
Regional Controls
We compute average rm size in a region as the sum of total assets divided by the number of
rms. This variable partially controls for selection problems in AMADEUS where some countries
are less likely to collect data for smaller rms. We proxy region size by the sum of total assets of the
23We use the Harmonized Consumer Price Index from Eurostat.
12rms in that region and, as another control, use annual average population series from Eurostat.
It is important to control for region size because volatility may be lower in large regions due to
averaging over a larger number of rms.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows mean, standard deviation, min and max values of our variables both at the rm
level as well as at the regional level. The statistics displayed are for ltered and winsorized data.
Volatility has a mean of 0.34 with a standard deviation of 0.62 with a maximum of 4.79 and a
minimum very close to 0. Foreign ownership is 1.26 percent on average with a standard deviation
of about 11. Foreign minority ownership is typically small while domestic minority ownership is
larger at 4.13 percent with a large standard error of about 14 percent. Average rm assets are
about 3.7 million euros but the standard deviation of assets is very large and the (winsorized)
maximum is 43 billion euros. Average assets of foreign owned rms are much larger, 32 million and
maximum is 24 billion. Clearly foreign owned rms are larger rms in general. Firm age is 18 year
on average with a large standard deviation and a maximum of 907.24
About 4 percent of all rms have some foreign ownership while 7 percent are exporters and 0.1
percent are listed. Exporters appear to have lower volatility on average, maybe due to diversied
markets. Of rms with some foreign ownership, 27.1 percent are fully owned by foreigners while
18.6 percent are \subsidiaries;" i.e., rms with only one foreign owner. More than half of the rms
with some foreign ownership have more than 50 percent foreign ownership.
Panel B displays region-level statistics. The time varying volatility measure, using AMADEUS
data, has a mean of 2 percent with a standard deviation of 3 percent, a minimum near 0 and a
maximum of 24 percent. Average volatility and its dispersion is lower when calculated from Eurostat
regional GDP data. On average, in a region about 8 percent of companies' assets are majority-
owned by foreigners, where we have one region having more than 50 percent of assets controlled
by foreign majority owners. Asset-weighted foreign minority ownership is small on average while
domestic minority ownership is 5 percent of assets in a region on average. The average amount of
assets in a given region is about 26 billion euros. We also report statistics to gauge the importance
24We checked on some of the rms of very high age and while we cannot with certainly rule out typos, it appears that
some European rms indeed are extremely old. The oldest rm is an Italian publishing house in Rome\A.T.S. ITALIA
EDITRICE S.R.L." while the hotel \HOTEL PICHLMAYRGUT GMBH & CO KG" in Austria is incorporated in
1117 according to AMADEUS. The latter date corresponds to the date given on the cote of arms displayed at the
hotel's WEB-page.
13of the foreign owned rms for regional volatility. These foreign-owned rms make up a signicant
share of regional economic activity as shown; 17 percent of the regional assets are owned by rms
that have some foreign ownership in a typical region with the maximum being 73 percent for one
region.
4 Empirical Analysis
We start by examining the relation between rm-level ownership patterns and rm-level volatility.
We focus on the sd measure for cross-sectional regressions and the sdt measure for the panel
regressions. For rm-level outcomes, we use operating revenue and sales, and we brie
y show
results for employment for completeness. Sales are typically used to study volatility but we prefer
operating revenue because sales are not available for rms in Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the
UK. Employment is less appropriate for our purposes since many European countries have labor
regulations aimed at limiting employment volatility.
4.1 Firm-Level Specications and Results
We regress volatility of rm outcomes on indicators of foreign and domestic ownership and rm
size and age. We include country (or region) and sector dummies implying that these regressions
solely exploit rm-level variation. Our specication is in log-log form in order to limit the in
uence
of rms with extremely high levels of volatility. The rm-level regression data are winsorized at
the 99 percent level to remove large outliers.
Cross-Sectional Regressions
For the cross-sectional specications, we estimate models using various samples for calculating
volatility and foreign ownership. The majority of the results are presented for rm-level volatility
measured over 2002{2006 and ownership variables measured in 2002. Our regressions use two basic
specications:
log(V OLijc) = c + s +  log(1 + FOijc) + X0
ijc + ijc ; (3)
and
log(V OLijc) = c + s + LOFijc +  log(1 + FMOijc) + 
 log(1 + DMOijc) + X0
ijc + ijc ; (4)
14where V OLijc is one of our cross-sectional volatility measures for rm i in region j in country c.
c is a country or region-specic constant and s is a set of industry dummies that are based on
the rm's primary industry code at the 2-digit NACE level.FOijc is percent foreign ownership,
LOFijc is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the largest owner is foreign, FMOijc is percent foreign
minority ownership, and DMOijc is domestic minority ownership. We take the logarithm of the
ownership data to make the distribution less skewed|the number 1 is added because most rms
have 0 foreign ownership. X0
ijc is a vector of controls.
Table 2 displays the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of equation (3) in
panel A and equation (4) in panel B, using the sample of \all rms." We display results in each
panel using sd for all our outcomes|sales, operating revenue, and employment. In panel A, we
nd that foreign ownership has a positive and highly signicant eect on volatility of all three
rm-level outcomes, regardless of using country- or region-xed eects. When we divide the foreign
ownership into largest owner and minority owners in panel B, we nd that rms for whom the
largest owner is foreign have signicantly higher volatility of sales and operating revenue than rms
for which the largest owner is domestic (with t-statistics of about 20). The estimated coecient
implies that foreign ownership is of economic importance: the coecient of about 0.2 implies that
rms whose largest owner is foreign has 20 percent higher volatility. Foreign minority ownership
is associated with higher volatility while domestic ownership is associated with lower volatility.
The coecients to these regressors are also highly signicant although the economic signicance
appears smaller with coecients around 0.04 for foreign minority ownership and {0.02 for domestic
minority ownership. A coecient of 0.04 implies that an increase in foreign minority ownership
of 50 percentage points will increase volatility by about 2 percent. Large rms (as measured
by assets) are less volatile with strong statistical and economic signicance. Finally, rm age is
highly statistically signicant, although the elasticity of {0.01 makes this variable less important
in economic terms. While the results are very similar for sales and operating revenue, they dier
quite a bit for employment. The foreign ownership variables are barely signicant|the dummy is
signicant at the 5 percent level, which is not impressive given the sample sizes, and foreign minority
ownership is insignicant. Domestic minority ownership has a negative eect of the size found for
sales and operating revenue, with very large statistical signicance. The elasticity for age is similar
to the age elasticities of sales and operating revenue but the elasticity of employment volatility with
respect to rm size is very large at about {0.20. Large rms clearly tends to avoid employment
volatility. When we use region-xed eects the eect of foreign ownership on employment volatility
turns out to be insignicant.
15The OLS results are driven by small rms because there are many more small than large rms;
however, large rms may be more important for macroeconomic volatility. We perform Weighted
Least Squares (WLS) regressions, weighting the observations by log-assets, but the WLS-results
are very similar and we do not tabulate them.
Table 3 explores robustness to the choice of volatility measure and to the samples of rms
used. We show results for operating revenue for which sample is largest|the results for sales are
similar and therefore not displayed. The two left-most columns consider the volatility measures,
cv or sdt. The latter measure is constructed for use in panel-data regressions but we wish to
ascertain beforehand that the change of measure in itself doesn't change the results. We nd
very similar coecients for these volatility measures, with highly signicant positive coecients to
foreign ownership and negative coecients to domestic ownership.
Column (3) considers large rms|a sample closer to the samples used in many previous studies.
The impact of foreign ownership on volatility is somewhat smaller for these rms as we get a
coecient of about 0.11 to the foreign ownership dummy compared to an estimate of about 0.21
in Table 2. Nonetheless, the value is still large in economic terms and the t-statistic remains huge
at about 10 even if the sample of large rms is much smaller at about 55,000. The coecients to
other variables for ownership and age are also about half the size found for the full sample while
the coecient to assets is much larger numerically at {0.16. The decline in volatility with size is
even accelerating as the rms get larger.
One may worry that rms that enter or drop out of our sample are aecting the results so we
alternatively select \permanent" rms. These are rms for which operating revenue is available in
all years 2002{2006 with no missing values. The results, in column (4), are quite close to those
found for all rms and do not warrant further comments. The same is true for permanent large
rms in column (5) for which the results are quite similar to those of all large rms in column (3).
Our results so far are strongly in agreement with our assumption that foreign investors invest in
more volatile rms and rms that are foreign owned are more willing to take risk than domestically
owned rms. We do not have a set of rm-level instruments which deliver \smoking gun" evidence
on causality but we proceed as follows in an attempt to advance on this issue.
Propensity Score Matching
Propensity score matching addresses a self-selection problem arising if rms' foreign-owned sta-
tus is non-random. In particular, systematic correlations between foreign-ownership and other rm
16characteristics could lead to biased estimates. The matching procedure controls for this potential
selection bias by creating an appropriate control group of domestic rms and repeating our re-
gressions using this, smaller, matched sample. This is particularly relevant in our case as only a
minority of rms have foreign owners. The matching proceeds as follows.
We match domestic rms with no foreign ownership to the set of rms with non-zero foreign
ownership. The matching is done for the year 2002. The match is based on the estimated \propen-
sity score," the logistic probability of having some foreign ownership. We allow the probabilities to
depend on rm age, total assets, country- and industry-dummies at the 2-digit NACE level. The
coecients obtained from the logistic estimation reveals, not surprisingly, that rm size is the most
important determinant of foreign ownership (with a t-statistic of 175), age is a negative predictor of
foreign ownership (with a t-statistic of around 9), and certain countries and sectors are signicantly
more likely to attract foreign ownership.
Based on the estimated propensity scores we select the sample of rms with no foreign ownership
which best match the sample of rms with non-zero foreign ownership. We apply nearest neighbor
propensity score matching without replacement, a procedure which matches each rm with foreign
ownership to the rm without foreign ownership that have the closest propensity scores.25 In
Figure 11, we display the frequency distributions of estimated propensity scores for rms with non-
zero foreign ownership, for the matched rms with no foreign ownership, and for the un-matched
rms with no foreign ownership. The sample of matched rms with no foreign ownership displays
a distribution of propensity scores which is very similar that of the rms with foreign ownership
indicating that these are observationally similar. Average age and average size are very close in the
matched samples.26
The results for the volatility regression using the matched sample, in Table 4, indicate that our
ndings are not spurious due to certain observable characteristics being dierent for foreign owned
rms since matching results are very similar to those obtained using the full sample. The average
eect of foreign ownership is estimated to be about 0.1|close to our un-matched estimates. We
have 24,697 rms with foreign ownership in the matched sample resulting in matched sample of
49,294 rm.
\Granger Causality"
25We use Stata's psmatch2 command, ver 3.0.0 written by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
26The mean of log-assets in the sample with foreign ownership is 15.29 and in the matched sample of rms with
no foreign ownership is 15.33, compared to 13.69 in the sample of unmatched rms. Formally doing the balancing
tests, we nd that 40 out of 48 variables that we match on pass the test as 5 percent level.
17We explore the dynamic patterns in the data. We veried that our results are robust to further
lagging of the ownership variables but since those results are very similar to those displayed we
do not tabulate them. Table 5 asks the harder question, if volatility tends to increase more in
rms that are foreign owned. We calculate yearly volatility for 2005{2006 and for 2003{2004 and
use the change in volatility as the dependent variable which we regress on 2002 ownership. We
display results for both the sd and cv measures and nd that rms whose largest owner is foreign
increase volatility by about 5 percent over a two-year period. This eect is estimated with statistical
signicance at the 10 percent level. The other regressors, except for rm age, are not signicant
(older rms are, somewhat surprisingly estimated to increase volatility more, although the size of
this eect appears negligible in terms of economic relevance). These results are consistent with
more diversied owners allowing rms to take more risk and hence suggest a causal eect from
foreign ownership to volatility|although it should be kept in mind that such \Granger causality"
regressions are not the nal word on causality. It appears that although domestic investors a priori
prefers less volatile rms, once rms has obtained domestic diversication they are not averse to
increasing volatility.
Robustness Regressions
We show a large number of robustness exercises in Appendix Tables A-1 and A-2. In the rst
column of Table A-1, we use average values of the independent variables over all years for which
data are available for a given rm (including the smaller year 2000 sample). The results are quite
similar to those of the rst column of Table 2 except that the eect of size, which isn't our focus,
is estimated to be smaller. In column (2), we regress volatility calculated for 2004{2006 on 2004
ownership which gives us a much larger sample of 1.3 million observations but with a more noisy
volatility measure. The results are similar to those found earlier with the estimated coecients
slightly smaller (0.17 versus 0.21 for the foreign ownership dummy) but with similar statistical
signicance. Clearly, our cross-sectional results are highly robust to how the sample is chosen.
In columns 3{5 of Table A-1, we include average rm-level growth during 2002{2006. Growth is
a potentially important variable as many models stress a trade-o between volatility and growth.27
We nd that growth is highly signicant with a t-statistic of 120 and a magnitude of high economic
importance consistent with a trade-o between high growth and high volatility of sales. The results
27Arnold and Javorcik (2009) use propensity score matching combined with a dierence-in-dierence approach to
establish that foreign ownership leads to signicant productivity improvements in acquired plants. See also Chari,
Chen, and Dominguez (2009).
18are quite similar for operating revenue and employment. The coecient to foreign ownership
is virtually unchanged whether growth is included or not. Thus, we prefer to not include the
endogenous growth variable in our main regressions.
Appendix Table A-2, using sales, reports a large number of sensitivity regressions. One might
worry that trade is an omitted variable or the eect of foreign ownership diers among exporters and
non-exporters. There might also be issues such as transfer pricing where multinational companies
setting up exporter aliates (which will show up as foreign owned rms) for the purpose of paying
less taxes on imported inputs. Hence, we run our regressions for these two samples obtaining
similar results. We also drop listed rms and subsidiaries to examine if our results are driven by
these certain rms. We want to ascertain that our results are not driven by 100 percent foreign
owned companies, because Alfaro and Charlton (2009) show that foreign subsidiaries often produce
highly specialized inputs for their parents. These robustness exercises show that our results remain
unaected. We exclude government-owned rms since these rms might be in strategic industries.
We use a sample of limited liability companies since these companies are all required to le and
hence we have minimum selection issues. We run our regressions on a sample of rm with non-zero
foreign ownership. We split the sample into rms in countries with good and bad coverage. Finally
we report a regression with only 9 Central and Eastern European countries to examine whether
the eect of foreign ownership on volatility diers in a developing country context.
The results are amazingly robust to all of these sample adjustments. In the case of \foreign
owned" which is a sample of rms with some foreign ownership, the coecient to the foreign
ownership dummy is smaller (although still strongly signicant) while the coecient to foreign
minority ownership becomes close to zero.28 This result is, however, not surprising as we remove
a lot of the variation in foreign ownership across rms by dropping every single fully domestically
owned rm. We repeat the analysis for operating revenue, but the results are similar and not
reported.
Panel Regressions
For our panel regressions we use permanent rms only and run the specication:
log(SDijct) = i +t +c t +s t +LOFijct + log(1+FMOijct)+
 log(1+DMOijct)+X
0
ijct +ijct ; (5)
where SDijct is the time-varying volatility measure for rm i in region j in country c at time
28While we have 40,000 rms with some foreign ownership, we have less in the regressions, in particular because
we drop nancial rms.
19t. i is a rm-specic constant, t is a time-xed eect and c  t and s  t are countryyear
(or regionyear) and industryyear xed eects. The time-varying volatility measure allows us to
track year-to-year changes in volatility and hence the purpose of these regressions is to examine
if the results still hold when we include rm-xed eects which control for rm-level unobserved
heterogeneity. We also include countryyear and industryyear dummies|if foreigns invest in
countries/regions or sectors that they correctly anticipate will be volatile over the relevant years,
the interacted dummies will absorb the impact of this. Of course, by including these eects we
stack the cards against nding results because some sectors may become more volatile because they
have gained in foreign diversication.
Table 6 shows the results. The rst column in Table 6 includes year dummies but no other
dummies and the results are similar to those of Table 2 with the exception of domestic cross-
ownership which is now estimated to be positive|an estimate which reverses sign when we include
dummy variables for countryyear and industryyear. This may re
ect that domestic investors
prefer certain sectors. Overall, the rst two columns establish that the results found in the cross-
sectional regressions are quite robust to the change in measure and inclusion of countryyear and
industryyear xed eects.
The focus of Table 6 is columns (3) and (4), where rm-specic xed eects are included|
these xed eects remove permanent dierences between rms and therefore remove most of the
variation in the data. The results are then driven by changes over time and reveal if increasing
foreign ownership goes hand-in-hand with increasing volatility. It does: the largest foreign owner
dummy is signicant at the 5 percent level with a positive sign although the coecient is smaller
than found in the cross-section. The economic eect is not that big but considering the limited
time variation this coecient is identied from, this result is about as strong as one could expect.
Firm size remains signicant indicating that volatility becomes smaller when assets grow.
The largest-owner-is-foreign dummy variable has limited time variation and we show results, in
columns (4) and (5), using overall foreign ownership as our regressor of interest. This variable is
signicant at the 1 percent level for all rms. The estimated coecient is an elasticity of 0.01 which
is not large in economic terms but the point of the regression is to make the qualitative point that
increasing foreign ownership and increasing volatility goes hand-in-hand, not just cross-sectionally
but also for rms over time. A positive eect of foreign ownership on volatility in these regressions
points to foreign diversication allowing for more risk taking, although these results do not rule
out that foreigners invest based on expected future volatility growth. The impact of rm size is
estimated to be negative for all rms.
20In column (5), we include the number of domestic owners, which we interpret as a measure
of ownership concentration. The results indicate a negative eect|as found in cross-section|
for domestic diversication with a t-statistic that is signicant at the 10 (near 5) percent level.
For completeness, in columns (6) and (7), we include the concentration of foreign ownership as
measured as the number of foreign owners. This variable is insignicant in column (6), but this
is explained by the results in column (7) which includes both the foreign ownership share and the
number of foreign owners. The former is now more signicant than found in columns (4) and (5)
and the latter is negatively signicant. This pattern is consistent with foreign owned rms being
more volatile. However, this partial eect gets weaker when the number of foreign owners are high
for given total foreign ownership share. Possibly, this is due to foreign minority owners having a
hard time being in
uential, maybe due to the cost of traveling abroad for meetings. These results
suggest that indeed when a low number of foreign shareholders own a controlling stake, they might
have a bigger say in the production decision of the rm, inducing more risk-taking.
Overall, the results of Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with a direction of causality going from
foreign ownership to volatility as one would expect given the strong cross-sectional results. To
make stronger statements on causality, one needs instrumental variables.
4.2 Region-Level Specications and Results
We now shift attention to region-level regressions with much lower degrees of freedom. We construct
region-level deep nancial integration measures by aggregating our rm-level ownership variables.
These are noisy measures because we don't have all the rms in any given region and this will
tend to attenuate signicance in our regressions. In order to minimize this measurement error, we
use only regions that have observations for 50 or more rms. As before, we restrict ourselves to
permanent rms so changes in the ownership variable will not be due to some large rms switching
in or out of the sample.
Median Volatility
We rst ask if average foreign ownership aects median volatility, which we interpret as the
typical level of volatility for a rm in a given region. We expect to nd results similar to those at the
rm level. We might nd no signicant result; for example, if variation in ownership is concentrated
in a small section of the distribution which do not include the median rm. We estimate the relation
21between regional nancial integration and median volatility using the specication:
log(SDMED
jct ) = j + t + c  t +  log(1 + FI)jct + X0
jct + jct ; (6)
where SDMED
jct is the median rm volatility in region j in country c, j is a region-specic constant,
and t is a year-specic constant, and c  t are countryyear dummies. In this regression, FIj
refer to the asset-weighted average percent foreign ownership in the region. We will also investigate
the majority ownership based integration measure that is the asset weighted average of the largest
owner foreign dummy, which has the interpretation of the share of assets in a region that belongs
to rms whose largest owner is foreign. X0
jt is a vector of regional controls.
Table 7, panel A considers whether volatility of the median rm correlates with deep nancial
integration; that is, the average level of foreign ownership in the region.29 The volatility of the
median rm is of some interest in itself but one of our goals in this paper is to examine how
aggregation aects the patterns of ownership and volatility across regions. The regression in Table 7
can be seen as a step towards this goal, as the ownership variable here is aggregated but the outcome
variable is not|such a regression will not give signicant results unless the aggregation of ownership
shows variation across regions over time. There is a positive signicant eect of nancial integration
on the volatility of the typical rm with signicance at the 10 percent level for the operating revenue
but not for sales. The coecient is larger and signicant for both outcomes when countryyear
dummies are included in the right-most two columns.
Panel B shows that the nancial integration measure based on shares of largest foreign owners
is important for median volatility with statistical signicance levels between 1 and 5 percent when
we include countryyear eects, while the shares owned by minority owners and domestic owners
are not robustly estimated.
Aggregate Volatility
The volatility of aggregated (by us) and aggregate (Eurostat) outcomes may or may not show
the same patterns as median volatility. For example, if the majority of variation for the rm-level
outcomes is distributed i.i.d. across rms and regions, aggregate volatility will be low and unlikely
to co-vary with average foreign ownership. Figure 12 compares the volatility of our aggregated data
and the Eurostat data. Both measures are high in 2001 and decline in 2002; the trend for both
29Note that as regional size controls we have total number of rms, average rm size, and total assets and only two
of these variables are linearly independent. We choose to include the latter two in our regressions.
22measures is downwards although Eurostat volatility has a peak in 2003 which is not found in the
AMADEUS aggregate. The volatility of the Eurostat output data is the lowest, which is intuitive
as this is the average over a much larger set of rms (including the government sector).
We estimate the eect of regional nancial integration on aggregate volatility using a specica-
tion similar to the one used for median volatility:
log(SDAGG
jct ) = j + t + c  t +  log(1 + FI)jct + X0
jct + jct ; (7)
where SDAGG
jct is the time-varying standard deviation of aggregated rm outcome growth, (i.e., the
sum of, say, rm-level operating revenue, in 2005 constant prices) or the time-varying standard
deviation of Eurostat output. As before, j is a region-specic constant, t is a year-specic
constant, and c  t is a countrytime dummy. FI is the asset-weighted average of the total
foreign ownership (or majority foreign ownership). X0
jct is the vector of controls.
The left-most four columns of Table 8 display results for the volatility of AMADEUS aggregated
outcomes while the right-most two columns display results for the volatility of regional GDP from
Eurostat. Using asset-weighted foreign ownership for nancial integration we nd a coecient
of around 0.7 (0.635{0.862) with signicance at 5 percent (1 percent for operating revenue when
countryyear dummies are included).
The variation in region-level nancial integration, which is a weighted average of foreign own-
ership, is obviously smaller than the variation in rm-level foreign ownership so we evaluate the
economic signicance of the coecient by comparing the implied variation in volatility when nan-
cial integration moves from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile, evaluated after controlling for
other regressors, in particular the dummy variables, to the actual variation in volatility.30 We nd
that the 90-10 range of integration (after controlling for other regressors) explains 12 percent of the
90-10 percent range in the (raw) volatility data. The result for Eurostat volatility is similar with a
coecient of 0.603 without the countryyear dummies and 0.573 with. The statistical signicance
is at the 1 percent and 10 percent level, respectively, and the economic signicance is that, for the
last column, the 90-10 range of nancial integration (after controlling for other regressors) explains
8 percent of the 90-10 range of volatility. The similarity of the Eurostat results to the results using
the AMADEUS aggregate is extremely reassuring because the Eurostat data contain the output of
30If X90 and X10 denote the 90th and 10th percentile of the residual of log(1 + FI), respectively, m is mean log-
volatility, and the regression coecient is , we consider the predicted variation to be exp(m +   X90)   exp(m +
  X10). The variation need to be evaluated around the mean of log-volatility because the exponential function is
highly non-linear.
23all establishments in a region while AMADEUS is a sample of rms. The main drawback of our
aggregation is that there are not a lot of rms in many regions and a few outliers can therefore
easily distort the results. Another issue is that the location of a rm's headquarters may not indi-
cate where most of the rm's output is produced. The similarity of the two sets of results indicates
strongly that our results are not spuriously driven by these issues. In the case of Eurostat volatility,
we, with high signicance, nd lower volatility in large populous regions, likely due to averaging
over a larger number of rms.
4.3 Endogeneity
It is important to know whether there is a causal eect of nancial integration on volatility. We
attack this issue using a policy experiment, namely the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
of the EU. The FSAP was a major policy initiative aimed at removing regulatory and legislative
barriers in the nancial sector. To achieve this goal, the FSAP was launched at the end of 1998 and
introduced a host of legislative-regulatory harmonization policies. The plan included 27 Directives
which are legal acts that do not become immediately enforceable in member countries which are
given time to adopt, modify, and eventually transpose the Directives into domestic law. This
transposition may take many years as some countries delay adaptation for various reasons.
We use this time variation in the number of directives adapted to instrument our nancial
integration measure|dierent directives are adopted at dierent times by dierent member coun-
tries. In order to obtain regional variation within countries, we interact the FSAP directives with
regional indicators of social capital, which we proxy with trust. We argue that country-level -
nancial harmonization policies eect regions dierently depending on their distribution of trust.
This instrumental variable strategy is appealing because one can link policy changes in nancial
sector with outcomes in the same industry. Our assumption is that the eect of these country-wide
policies on regional integration depends on the extent of the regional trust. The trust data come
from the European Social Survey and has been shown by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004,
2006, 2009) to predict many nancial decisions.31
Our instrument is the interaction of the level of regional trust with the index of nancial
harmonization. Specically, we use 3 dierent indictors of trust and 10 directives out of 27 that are
31The European Social Survey were designed to enable cross-national, cross-cultural comparisons of values and
norms on a wide variety of topics and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. We take the
average of individual responses for each region.
24related to easing restrictions on foreign ownership.32 Our index of nancial harmonization will be
a sum of indicator variables where each indicator will be one in the year the particular directive is
adapted and after. The 3 indicators for regional trust are \trust in other people," \general level of
trust," and \trust in institutions.33" We use each of the trust variables interacted with the index
of nancial harmonization as instruments.
We rst show results from a reduced form regression. We regress the standard deviation of
GDP per capita from Eurostat on our instrument. The reduced form estimates are proportional
to the causal eect of interest. We nd a strong positive eect of our instrument regardless of
the trust variable used, see Table 9. The estimated coecients to the instrument are signicant
at the 5-10 percent level. It is highly reassuring that the estimated eect is very robust to which
trust measure is used. The reduced form coecient to the instrument in the rst column, to pick
one, implies that the 90-10 range of the instrument (after controlling for other regressors) explains
15 percent of the 90-10 range in the raw volatility data. The results are consistent with the OLS
ndings and say that nancial laws interacted with social capital, which can be interpreted more of
a structural measure of nancial integration, having a statistical and economically signicant eect
on volatility.
Next, we proceed with 2SLS estimation. The bottom panel of Table 10 displays the rst-
stage regression results. For either of the trust measures, the instrument predicts an increase in
deep nancial integration across regions with high levels of signicance at better than 1 percent.
The eect is also economically signicant. A one-standard-deviation change in the instrument
(corresponding to 3 laws implemented in a region with average trust) will imply an increase in
regional nancial integration of about 35 percent.34 The F-test for the exogenous instrument is
about 10 and satises the rule-of-thumb for instruments not being weak suggested by Stock and
Yogo (2002). Overall, the rst-stage results are quite convincing. Figure 13 shows a strong rst-
stage t when we plot nancial integration against our instrument.
Financial integration is statistically signicant in all the second-stage regressions with condence
levels around 10 percent. Given that we have large number of dummy variables and limited time
variation, we nd these results convincing|especially because of the robustness to measure of trust
is used. The estimated coecients are large: between 1.97 and 2.44. Considering the 90-10 range
32We exclude the directives that relate to banking integration. See Appendix B for details.
33See Appendix B for the exact questions.
34The standard deviation is about 1.5 and average trust is about 0.5. Multiplying 1.5 with a coecient of around
0.7 results in a value of log(1 + FI) about 1 which corresponds to a value of FI of about 1.6, corresponding to 35
percent of the mean value of FI.
25of instrumented nancial integration after controlling for other regressors we nd, picking the rst
column, that the estimated coecient of 2.44 implies that nancial integration explains a large
share, 34 percent, of the 90-10 range of raw volatility. The fact that the IV results are larger than
OLS results suggests that the OLS results are biased downwards. This is the direction of bias one
should have expected given the possibility of classical measurement error in our regional nancial
integration measure.
The validity of our results rests on the exclusion restriction that the instruments do not aect
volatility directly but only through the eect of regional nancial integration which is proxied by
the average level of foreign ownership. This restriction is plausible for two reasons: First, we use the
directives that relate specically to increasing foreign ownership. Second, the dummy for adoption
of a directive turns on at the same time for all regions in a country, independently of volatility or
other characteristics of regions.
4.4 Reconciling the Results with the Macro Literature
Going back to Figure 1, our rm- and region-level results might be dierent from country-level
regressions for three reasons: First, the eect of nancial integration on volatility might be dierent
for developed and developing countries and so far we have used a set of developed countries. Table 11
tackles this issue by repeating our estimation for the entire sample of the 25 EU countries, including
emerging economies, but the results are very similar to those of Table 2. This is also consistent
with the previously shown robustness result in Table A-2, where we did our regression only for 9
developing CEE countries.
Second, our measure of nancial integration (which is a weighted average of rm-level foreign
ownership) might capture a dierent aspect of nancial integration than the standard country-level
measures used in Figure 1. Our measure is based on FDI and portfolio equity holdings and does
not include any debt liabilities. However, our measure is highly correlated with various standard
country-level measures of nancial integration as shown in Table 12. The cross-country correlations
in panel A are 0.80 for both equity and total liabilities and the time-series correlations, displayed
for 8 random countries, are very high for most countries, especially considering the fact that the
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti measures are constructed in a quite dierent manner. In particular, the
large valuation movements in equity over the last two decades creates large variation in country
level asset-liability shares of GDP while our ownership shares do not, everything else equal, vary
with valuation.
26The third reason why our results might dier from the literature is classic identication problems
in country-level studies. At the aggregate level integration and volatility are determined simultane-
ously and both are aected by country-level omitted factors such as policy shocks. Industry-level
shocks and global factors may also contribute to spurious results at the country level. We can deal
explicitly with these type of identication problems in this paper. We therefore believe our results
show a more robust and well-identied eect of nancial integration on volatility.
5 Conclusion
We uncovered a strong, highly signicant, positive association between rm-level volatility and
foreign ownership. A rm whose largest owner is foreign is 20 percent more volatile. The positive
association between foreign ownership and volatility carries over to the regional level where our
results imply that nancial integration can explain up to 15 percent of the variation in aggregate
volatility.
Our results hold in both static and dynamic regressions with rm- and region-xed eects. Our
results are, at the least, strongly consistent with a causal eect from foreign ownership to volatil-
ity using dierent identication techniques such as propensity score matching, dynamic patterns,
and IV-regressions. We argue that country-level studies deliver ambiguous results due to omitted
variables such as country- and industry-level shocks which we control for.
Our IV-regressions exploit variation from a policy experiment, the Financial Services Action
Plan (FSAP) of the EU. The instrument is constructed by interacting the regional distribution of
social capital (measured as trust) with an index of nancial harmonization, which is derived from
the transposition dates of the FSAP to country-level laws. Using this instrument, we nd quite
strong support for a causal eect of deep nancial integration on volatility|the IV-estimates imply
that variation in nancial integration can explain 30 percent of the variation in aggregate volatility.
Our results further suggest that some foreign investors purchase small stakes in domestic com-
panies for the purpose of diversication. Because such investors are diversied they are relatively
more willing to purchase shares of high-volatility rms. We sketch a simple mean-variance model of
foreign diversication in Appendix C with two otherwise symmetric countries with dierent volatil-
ities of aggregate output. However, a large share of foreign investment are due to investors|often
other rms|taking majority stakes in domestic companies. Because majority owners control pro-
duction, our results suggest that the causal eect of foreign ownership on volatility to a large extent
27is due to foreign controlling majority owners being willing to engage in more risky production.
Our results do not imply that nancial integration is undesirable because of higher volatility.
Foreigners invest in high return-high variance projects which are likely to increase growth and
volatility can be seen as a side-eect. Further, theory suggests that nancial integration reduces
consumption volatility because capital income, and possibly wage income, gets smoothed via diver-
sication. A promising area for future research is to examine this question using combined micro
and macro data.
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32Appendix A: A Model of International Diversication
We present a stylized static model. For simplicity, we consider a two country framework where
the two countries are symmetric, except for dierent volatilities of output. The notation for the
foreign country is similar to that of the domestic country, except the variables are labeled with a
\*." Assume that each of the two countries has two types of investors: small investors (households)
has an amount Si available for nancial investment while large (institutional) investors has an
amount SI. Investors can chose to invest in a safe asset with gross return R and in two types of
\representative" rms with exogenous output (\fruit on trees"). One type of rm has low variance
of output (and thus dividends) while the other type has high variance. We assume there is one unit
of equity available to investors (\one tree") for each type of rm.
We assume each representative low (high) variance rm has output YL (YH) normalized to have
mean 1. The variance of low volatility output is (Y
L)2 while that of high volatility output is (Y
H)2.
Output is sold to investors and the price of one unit of low (high) variance output is 1=L (1=H).
With our normalization this is also the market value of each type of production (\tree"). The
expected gross returns to investing in, say, low volatility output, is then L while the standard






Next, we assume a simple structure for dividends. This is equivalent to making assumptions on
the exogenous output, but simplies notation. We then postulate a mean variance trade-o for
investors and solve for both home and foreign investors' demands for dierent types of output.
Investors take the mean returns from investing in home and foreign high- and low-volatility output
as given. Finally, we use the market clearing conditions to determine the mean returns and solve
for the general equilibrium.
We denote the gross dividends from investing in the low variance rm by XL (= YL=L) and
dividends from investing in high variance rms with XH (= YH=H). We assume that rm shocks
are composed of an aggregate shock  and a idiosyncratic rm shock L (H) that is specic to low
33(and high) variance rms. The shocks are best thought of as productivity shocks.35 Given these
assumptions, we can write the dividends as;
XL = L + 
L   + L ;
and
XH = H + 
H   + H :
The country-wide shock  aects all rms but the eect diers between low and high variance rms
due to the respective 
 parameters. All shocks are identically independently distributed (i.i.d.)
across rms with the following mean and variances:   (0;2); L  (0;2
L); H  (0;2
H) :
The i.i.d. assumption implies: cov(;L) = 0; cov(;H) = 0; cov(L;H) = 0 : We assume
shocks in the foreign country have a similar structure and all foreign shocks are independent of
domestic shocks.
There is a xed cost  of investing abroad such that small investors will only invest domestically.
A small home investor can invest a share i
L in domestic low variance rms and a share i
H in high
variance rms while large home investors can invest a share I
L in domestic low variance rms, a
share I
H in high variance rms, and a share I
HF in foreign high variance rms. Companies do not
have access to low variance technology in the foreign country. We assume this is due to frictions in
information or communication.36
A small investor maximizes his or her utility, Ui, from investing a given amount of savings.
We assume that the utility for each dollar invested can be couched in terms of mean and variance
consistent with approximating utility with a quadratic utility function, and the optimal investment
shares being independent of the total amount invested. This approximation is reasonable as we only
model the allocation of given savings (since we do not observe savers a more ambitious approach
would serve little purpose for us).
Thus the small investor maximizes (with respect to i
L and i
H):
Ui = (1   i
L   i
H)R + i
L  L + i
H  H   Var( + i
L(
L   + L) + i
H(
H   + H)) ;
where R is the gross safe world rate of return. We assume the country-wide shock  enters the
utility function directly, in addition to its eect on production. We refer to this as \background
35Note that aggregate shocks can also be thought of country or industry specic.
36See Iacoviello and Minetti (2008).
34noise" (this may enter the decision problem, for example, because country-wide shocks also aect
wage income of the domestic investor).
A large investor can invest also in foreign rms and hence maximizes




L  L + I
H  H + I
HF  
H (10)
  var( + I
L(
L   + L) + I
H(
H   + H) + I
HF(

H   + 
H)) :
Using the abbreviation V i for the variance of the portfolio of small savers, we nd:
V i = Var( + i
L(
L   + L) + i
H(
H   + H))
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The derivative of V I wrt. I
L and I
H are similar to those found earlier, so
I
L =































The market clearing conditions for low and high-variance output, respectively, are:
Sii
L + SII





HF = 1=H ; (17)
where SI denotes the savings of large foreign investors, and I
HF denotes the investments share of
these investors in the home economy.
The nine equations, together with the equivalent equations for the foreign country, (two resource
constraints, ve equations for investment shares, and the relations between means and variances)
form a set of non-linear equations which can be solved for mean returns and investment shares.
We numerically solved the model with the following values:
Exogenous values for model simulation





Home 10 10 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.05 0.1 1.05
Foreign 10 10 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.05 0.1 1.05







Home 1.064 1.069 0.047 0.0002 0.047 0.0002 0.039
Foreign 1.055 1.057 0.047 0.028 0.047 0.028 0.093
Notes: Variances are not displayed as they are trivially determined from equations (8) and (9).
We do not observe mean returns and risk premiums in our data but for our choice of exogenous
variables, the solutions for the risk premium    R are reasonable (i.e., positive, higher for high
36volatility output than for low volatility output, and higher in the home country with higher aggre-
gate \background" volatility).
Our simple model sketch is designed to interpret patterns of foreign investment and implies by
design that domestic small investors only invest in domestic rms given the xed cost of investing
abroad. The model implies that domestic investment in high volatility rms is small (shares of
0.0002 for both small and large investors) relative to own-country investment in high volatility
rms in the foreign economy (shares of 0.028) with lower background noise. The more interesting
implication of the model is the clear dierence between domestic investment abroad and foreign
investment in the home economy. Large investors abroad behave similarly to large domestic in-
vestors, but the high domestic background noise makes foreign investment in the domestic economy
much larger. This shows that our simple framework captures the positive correlation between re-
gional volatility and foreign investment, although our static framework cannot model the dynamic
patterns found in our data.
In reality, and outside of our model, entrepreneurs who create rms will typically need to hold
some equity in the rm|whether it is of high- or low-variance type.37 In our regressions, we include
a dummy that is unity if the largest owner is foreign and the left-out dummy, which is captured by
the constants, is then the largest domestic owner. We implicitly interpret the constant as capturing
domestic entrepreneurs. A reasonable assumption, we believe, is that domestic entrepreneurs typi-
cally are individuals who happen on a business idea, independently of whether this leads to high or
low variance output. By contrast, domestic minority investors seek out low-variance investments
and, therefore, domestic minority ownership will have a negative coecient. The model deliver the
solution that high-volatility rms are partly owned by foreign investors although the foreigners'
choice between being minority owner or largest owner is not modeled. (Our empirical analysis
reveals that foreigners most often prefer to be the largest owner for reasons such as information or
control.)
37This is due to moral hazard. A standard reference is Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
37Appendix B: Data
Sample Selection
AMADEUS is a database of rm-level information such as sales, employment, and assets for 41
countries with varying coverage. The database totals over 15 million public and private companies
of large, medium, and small size with listed companies comprising only a small fraction of about
10 thousand companies.38 A company which has subsidiaries is required to prepare consolidated
accounts; however, we use only unconsolidated accounts to avoid double counting.39
We focus on 16 countries with 9.9 million unique rms, of which many have missing outcomes
and/or assets. Once we require rms to have at least 1 year of assets and 1 year of an outcome|
either sales, operating revenue, or employment, we have 4.7 million rms. From this sample we drop
all nancial rms, rms that in any year have assets less than 1,000 euros, employment negative,
zero, or larger than 2 million, negative sales, or negative operating revenue. We drop rms that do
not have ownership information and rms below the 0.1th percentile and above the 99.9th percentile
in the distribution of sales to assets, operating revenue to assets, and employment to assets in any
year. For the ratio of revenue to sales we drop rms above the 95th percentile in order to eliminate
rms with high nancial income. Although we drop all nancial rms, many companies that are not
nancial but have signicant investment income. An extreme example is Warren Buett's Berkshire
Hathaway, even that started as a textile rm and then became only an investment company over
time. We also eliminate rms with sales larger than operating revenue. Overall, these lters allow
us to get rid of phantom rms, tax-fronts, etc. In addition, we drop rms where growth of sales,
operating revenue, or employment is more than 100 percent for larger companies (100 employees),
more than 300 percent for medium-sized companies (20-100 employees), and more than 500 (1000)
38While collecting rm-level data, BvD takes advantage of legal requirements for European companies to le their
accounts at ocial government registries. The data are then organized in a standardized format.
39Even though the number of consolidated accounts is less than 1 percent of all accounts, it is important to use
just the unconsolidated accounts. AMADEUS categorizes all companies as subsidiaries regardless of the percentage
of ownership: In standard accounting, a company A will be classied as a subsidiary of a company B if company
B owns more than 50 percent of company A, while in AMADEUS company A will be called a subsidiary even
company B owns a 1 percent stake. There can be direct subsidiaries and also indirect subsidiaries owned by the
direct subsidiaries. For example, BMW has 186 recorded subsidiaries, 54 of which are outside Europe (like BMW
United States) and hence not in our data set. 77 out of the remaining 132 are direct subsidiaries owned more than
50 percent by the parent company. The remaining 55 companies are subsidiaries of these 77 companies. Another
example is LEGO, that has 38 subsidiaries where only 3 of these are directly owned while the rest are subsidiaries
of these 3. By using unconsolidated accounts outcomes do not include the outcome of parents and subsidiaries. By
looking at the consolidated accounts of the 3 direct subsidiaries, we veried that the sum of sales and employment of
the indirect subsidiaries is less than the numbers reported in the consolidated accounts of the 3 direct subsidiaries.
(It will not be an exact match since we do not have data for subsidiaries outside Europe).
38percent for smaller companies with 11-20 (0-10) employees. If employment is missing we drop rms
with growth rates over 2000 percent.
Firms that acquire other companies may experience \spurious" increases in assets, sales, and
employees. For example, if two rms with 100 employees merge to a rm with 200 employees which
continue to operate as one of the original rms this will appear as a growth rate of 100 percent
for the continuing rm and {100 percent for the acquired rm. However, there might have been
no change in employment of the combined rm. We use the global ZEPHYR database from the
BvD which contains \deal records;" i.e., in each M&A, the target, the acquiring party or parties,
the dates when the deal was announced and completed, and the type of the deal (e.g., Acquisition,
Acquisition of 15%, Merger, Joint Venture, etc.). The ZEPHYR data can easily be matched with
our data because a BvD company identier is included in both databases. We eliminate acquirer
rms which may have spurious growth following an acquisition. After this selection process we end
up with a sample of a little over 1 million unique rms.
To give an example how each step eliminates rms consider 2006 in which we have 3 million
rms with at least 1 year of assets and outcome. Out of these, 100,000 do not report ownership
information and 500,000 rms have assets less than 1000 euros. 100,000 are nancial rms and 1
million has faulty records such as no, or negative, employment. Another 100,000 rms are dropped
due to our procedures explained above that lters out rms in the tails, etc., which brings us to
1.2 million rms.
One might worry about selection issues where rms that report ownership information are
unrepresentative. Figure 14 shows the distribution of assets for all available rms in 2006, and for
rms that report ownership information and for the non-reporting rms. The distribution of assets
is very similar across these groups indicating that the rms which report ownership are similar to
the sample as a whole.
Our rms represent a wide range of industries. We drop rms in certain industries for robustness
checks as detailed in the paper. The classication of 2 digit NACE industries are as follows:
39Code Name of the Level 2 NACE sector
AA Agriculture, hunting, and forestry
BA Fishing
CA Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials
CB Mining and quarrying, except of energy producing materials
DA Manufacturing of food products, beverages, and tobacco
DB Manufacturing of textile products
DC Manufacturing of leather products
DD Manufacturing of wood products
DE Manufacturing of pulp, paper products, publishing and printing
DF Manufacturing of coke, rened petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
DG Manufacturing of chemical products
DH Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
DI Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products
DJ Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal products
DK Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DL Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment;
DM Manufacturing of transport equipment
DN Manufacturing n.e.c.
EA Electricity, gas and water
FA Construction
GA Wholesale and retail trade; repair
HA Hotels and restaurants
IA Transport, storage, and communication
JA Financial intermediation
KA Real estate, renting, and business activities
LA Public administration and defence, compulsory social security
MA Education
NA Health and social work
OA Other community, social and personal service activities
PA Activities of households
QA Extra-territorial organizations and bodies (such as UN, EC, etc)
40What does Foreign Ownership capture and why does it change over time?
As explained in the data section, we construct foreign ownership FO using the information from
the AMADEUS Ownership database. We veried that this database completely includes the in-
formation in the ZEPHYR database of Mergers and Acquisitions and adds to this since foreign
ownership can change over time due to other reasons then M&As.
Let us consider some examples. Example 1 is the French steel company Usinor SA which is
now part of the world's largest steel company ArcelorMittal. Based on the information from the
AMADEUS Ownership database the FO for the Usinor SA was 2.9 percent in 2000, 97.58 percent in
2002, and 100 percent in 2006 and 2008. In 2000, FO consists of two identied non-French owners
(Lucchini International SA and Gruppo Lucchini, both Italian) and the company had a signicant
stake owned by \public" (>70 percent), which we assume consists of French small investors. In
2002 the company has just two owner records: Arcelor SA (Luxembourg) with 97.58 percent and
\public" with 2 percent. In 2006 the company changes the name to Arcelor France and the single
owner is Arcelor SA (Luxembourg) with a 100 percent stake. In 2008 the company changes the
name to ArcelorMittal France with the same owner and stake. The BvD ID of the company remains
unchanged in all 4 Ownership vintages despite the name changes.
Using this BvD ID for Usinor SA, we can locate the records for this company in ZEPHYR we
nd a single record where Usinor SA was involved in the deal \Acquisition 97.58 percent" by the
Arcelor SA of Luxembourg, announced on 12/12/2001 and completed on 14/03/2002.
Example 2 is the French lawn care company Top Green SAS (www.topgreen.com). Based
on the information in the AMADEUS Ownership database FO for the Top Green SAS was 50
percent in 2004, 67 percent in 2006, and 66 percent in 2008. From 2004 to 2008, FO consists of
one identied non-French owner DLF Trifolium A/S of Denmark which holds stakes in the French
company. The only other owner is the French rm Vilmorin Clause et Compagnie.
Using the BvD ID for Top Green SAS we locate the records for this company in ZEPHYR
and obtain a single record where Top Green SAS was involved in the deal \Acquisition increased
from 50 percent to 67 percent" by DLF Trifolium A/S which was announced on 19/09/2006. As a
result, the stake of DLF in Top Green SAS went up from 50 percent to 67 percent between 2004
and 2006. The 1 percent sale by DLF between 2006 and 2008 is not found in ZEPHYR.
Example 3 is the French software rm PTV Online (www.ptv-vision.fr). Based on information
in the AMADEUS Ownership database FO for PTV Online was 40 percent in 2004 and 100 percent
41in 2006. In 2004, FO consists of one identied non-French owner PTV Planung Transport Verkehr
AG (PTV AG) of Germany, owning 40 percent. The additional two owners of the company in 2004
are the French company 01Direct with 40 percent and an individual, Mr. Stern, with 20 percent.
Using the BvD ID for PTV Online we locate the records for this company in ZEPHYR and
obtain a single record where PTV Online was involved in the deal \Acquisition increased from 40
percent to 100 percent" by PTV AG which was announced and completed on 12/9/2005. PTV
AG is a global company with the head oce is located in Karlsruhe which specializes in trac and
logistics software, and transport consulting and has branches in 11 countries.
The examples demonstrate that ownership information in ZEPHYR is clearly re
ected in our
FO variable, but there is some additional information in the AMADEUS Ownership database which
ZEPHYR misses. The following examples show companies that had changes in FO based on the
Ownership database but which do not appear in ZEPHYR.
The French defense company NHIndustries SAS (NHI) is, according to the company website,
the prime contractor for design and development, industrialization, production and logistic support
of the naval/tactical helicopter NH90 used by the armed forces of several European NATO countries.
Based on information in the AMADEUS Ownership database FO for NHI was 37 percent in 2002,
68 percent in 2004, 68.01 percent in 2006, and 68.51 percent in 2008. In 2002, FO consists of two
identied non-French owners: Agusta Westland (Italy) with 32 percent and Stork Fokker Aerospace
NV (The Netherlands) with 5 percent. The other owner of the company is the French company
Eurocopter France with 32 percent. In 2004 FO becomes 68 percent due to the divestment of
Eurocopter France in favor of the German company Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH. In 2006 an
Italian rm Finmeccanica - Societa' Per Azioni appears as a new owner with a small stake and in
2008 the stake of Stork NV increases to 6 percent.
The French fashion and perfume company Parfums Nina Ricci SA (www.ninaricci.com) has
operated since 1932 and is a private company. Based on information in the AMADEUS Ownership
database FO for Nina Ricci SA was 50 percent in 2000 and 2002, 51 percent in 2004, and 0 percent
in 2006 and 2008. In 2000{2004 the company was 50 percent owned by Jorba BV of the Netherlands
and a Spanish company Antonio Puig SA appears to hold a minority stake of around 1 percent in
2004. The domestic owners are Paco Rabanne Parfums with 36 percent and Puig France and Puig
International SA with 5 percent each. From 2006 on the only owner of the company is the French
Puig France with a 100 percent stake. According to the company website, Parfums Nina Ricci SA
now operates as a subsidiary of Puig Prestige Beaute (France).
42Constructing the Instrument
The Financial Harmonization Directives Index is the sum of individual nancial directive dummies.
Directive dummies take the value of 1 if a Directive has been implemented in given year in given
country; 0 otherwise. The Directives that we use are as follows:
1998/26/EC Implementation of the Settlement Finality Directive
2001/86/EC Directive supplementing the Statute for a European Company
with regard to the involvement of employees
2002/13/EC Directive amending the solvency margin requirements in the insurance directives
2003/48/EC Directive on the taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments
2002/83/EC Directive amending the solvency margin requirements in the insurance directives
2003/41/EC Directive on the prudential supervision of pension funds
2003/71/EC Directive on prospectuses
2004/25/EC Directive on Take Over Bids
2006/48/EC Directive relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business
of credit institutions
2006/49/EC Directive on the capital adequacy of investment rms and credit institutions
The regional trust variables are as follows: \Trust in Other People" varies from 0 to 10 and is
the answer on an increasing scale to the question \Most people can be trusted"; \General Level of
Trust" takes values 0{10 and averages answers on an increasing scale to the questions \Most people
can be trusted" and \Most people try to be fair"; \Trust in Institutions" varies between 0 and 10
and averages answers to the following questions: \Do you trust in country's parliament", \Do you
trust in the legal system", \Do you trust in the police", \Do you trust in political parties", \Do
you trust in the European Parliament", \Do you trust in the United Nations."
Regions Excluded from Region-Level Regressions
\Island" and Overseas Regions
We exclude all islands and overseas regions: Ciudad Aut onoma de Ceuta (ES63), Ciudad
Aut onoma de Melilla (ES64); Canarias (ES70),  Aland (FI20), Guadeloupe (FR91), Martinique
(FR92), Guyane (FR93), Reunion (FR94), Valle d'Aosta/Vall ee d'Aoste (ITC2), Regi~ ao Aut onoma
dos A cores (PT20), Regi~ ao Aut onoma da Madeira (PT30).
Underdeveloped and Small Regions
43We exclude sparsely populated regions with population density less than the 10th percentile.
These are Extremadura (ES43), East Finland (FI13), West Finland (FI19), Agder og Rogaland
(NO04), and Alentejo (PT18).
We also exclude relatively small and poor regions with the average GDP per capita less than
15th percentile in the distribution within the corresponding country. These are Hainaut (BE32),
Campania (ITF3), East Middle Sweden (SE12), Tees Valley and Durham (UKC1), Merseyside
(UKD5), South Yorkshire (UKE3), and Lincolnshire (UKF3).
We exclude regions with high share of agriculture, specically a share of agriculture larger than
85th percentile in the distribution across all regions. The regions excluded are Murcia (ES62),
Champagne-Ardenne (FR21), Poitou-Charentes (FR53), Algarve (PT15), and Alentejo (PT18).
Outlier Regions
We exclude regions which experienced a change in ownership above 20 percent during our
sample period: Auvergne (FR72), Border, Midland and Western (IE01), Friuli-Venezia Giulia
(ITD4), North Middle Sweden (SE31), Upper Norrland (SE33), and Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and
North Somerset (UKK1);
Some regions are outliers in partial correlation plots in a particular year only. These regions
might have coverage related issues because certain years look very dierent and we eliminated those.
These are Antwerpen (BE21), Limburg (BE22), Vlaams-Brabant (BE24), Brabant Wallon (BE31),
Namur (BE35), Dresden (DED2), Comunidad Foral de Navarra (ES22), Midi-Pyr en ees (FR62),
Provincia Autonoma Bolzano/Bozen (ITD1), Abruzzo (ITF1), Sardegna (ITG2), Cheshire (UKD2),
Kent (UKJ4), Shropshire and Staordshire (UKG2), Rh^ one-Alpes (FR71), Greater Manchester
(UKD3), Surrey, East and West Sussex (UKJ2), Eastern Scotland (UKM2), and Highlands and
Islands (UKM4).
44Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Firm-level data
Firm Outcome Operating Revenue (1,047,463 rms)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Volatility, sd 0.34 0.62 0 4.79
Foreign Ownership (%) 1.26 10.75 0 100
Foreign Minority Ownership (%) 0.04 1.23 0 75.00
Domestic Minority Ownership (%) 4.13 14.06 0 95.87
Total Assets (million 2005 euros) 3.73 81.98 0 43,620
Firm Age (years) 17.89 12.09 1 907
Total Assets, Firms w. Non-Zero 32.89 257.7 0 24,430
Foreign Ownership (million 2005 euros)
Percent Firms Average Volatility
Out of All Firms (1,047,463 rms)
Non-Zero Foreign Ownership 4.1 0.37
Exporters 7.0 0.24
Listed 0.1 0.36
Out of Firms with Non-Zero Foreign Ownership
(42,428 rms)
100% Foreign Ownership 27.1 0.36
Foreign Subsidiaries 18.6 0.37
Largest Owner is Foreign 43.3 0.34
Foreigners Hold > 50% 52.7 0.38
Panel B: Region-Level data
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Time-varying Volatility (AMADEUS), sdt 0.02 0.03 0.00003 0.24
Time-varying Volatility (EUROSTAT), sdt 0.01 0.01 0.00006 0.07
Financial Integration (%) 7.00 7.91 0 51.84
Financial Integration (Majority Owners) (%) 8.36 8.99 0 51.98
Financial Integration (Minority Owners) (%) 0.25 0.61 0 5.74
Financial Integration (Domestic) (%) 4.79 4.91 0.0002 25.51
Total Assets (billion 2005 euros) 25.85 45.90 0.32 349.8
Fraction of Foreign-Owned Assets 0.17 0.16 0 0.73
Notes: \Exporters" are rms reporting non-zero export revenue. \Listed" are public companies listed on stock
exchanges. \100% Foreign Ownership" are companies that are fully owned by foreigners, while \Foreign subsidiaries"
are companies that are fully owned by a single foreign owner. \Largest Owner is Foreign" refers to rms where the
owner with the largest stake is foreign, while \Foreigners Hold > 50%" are companies where foreigners own more
than 50 percent. \Fraction of Foreign-Owned Assets" is the fraction of assets owned by rms who have non-zero
foreign ownership in a given region. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.Table 2: Firm-Level Volatility and Foreign Ownership
Sample: All rms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Log Volatility of rm outcome
Volatility Measure Std. dev. of rm outcome growth, sd
Firm Outcome Sales Operating Employment Sales Operating Employment
Revenue Revenue
Panel A: Eects of Foreign Ownership
Log Foreign Ownership .050*** .040*** .004** .043*** .032*** {.000
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Log Total Assets {.079*** {.081*** {.204*** {.078*** {.081*** {.203***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Firm Age {.011*** {.011*** {.009*** {.011*** {.011*** {.009***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Panel B: Eects of Majority/Minority Foreign Ownership
Largest Owner is Foreign .211*** .168*** .015* .178*** .134*** {.004
(.010) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.008) (.008)
Log Foreign Minority Ownership .036*** .038*** {.007 .033*** .033*** {.008
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Log Domestic Minority Ownership {.014*** {.027*** {.016*** {.015*** {.027*** {.016***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Log Total Assets {.079*** {.081*** {.203*** {.077*** {.080*** {.202***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Firm Age {.011*** {.011*** {.008*** {.011*** {.011*** {.009***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Country Fixed E. yes yes yes no no no
Region Fixed E. no no no yes yes yes
Industry Fixed E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firms 760,260 1,047,463 577,196 745,047 1,030,619 567,706
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the rm level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, * and
y denote signicance
at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, resp. sd is the standard deviation of growth of rm outcome over 2002{2006. The
explanatory variables are for 2002. Log Foreign Ownership denotes the logarithm of 1+percent ownership share that
belongs to foreigners. Largest Owner is Foreign is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the largest owner
of a given rm is a foreigner. Log Foreign Minority Ownership denotes the logarithm of 1+the remaining percent
ownership share belonging to foreigners after the share of the largest owner is excluded; Log Domestic Minority
Ownership is calculated similarly. Firm Age is the dierence between the end year in our sample and the date of
incorporation. Sales, Operating Revenue, and Assets are all in 2005 constant euros. For rms in Denmark, Ireland,
Great Britain, and Norway, sales are not available. Employment is the number of full-time employees. Industry-xed




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 4: Firm-Level Volatility and Foreign Ownership: Propensity Score Matching
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable:
Log Volatility of Firm Outcome
Volatility Measure Std. dev. of rm outcome growth, sd
Firm Outcome Operating Revenue
Firm Sample All rms Large rms
Average Eect of .152*** .117***
Foreign Ownership (.010) (.014)
Regressions using Matched Sample
Largest Owner is Foreign .121*** .085***
(.010) (.014)
Log Foreign Minority Ownership .028*** .019*
(.008) (.011)
Log Domestic Minority Ownership {.015*** {.015**
(.005) (.007)
Log Total Assets {.081*** {.149***
(.003) (.010)
Firm Age {.006*** {.004***
(.000) (.000)
Country Fixed E. yes yes
Industry Fixed E. yes yes
Firms 49,394 19,326
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the rm level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, * and
y denote signicance
at levels 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%, resp. Matching is performed on rm age, total assets, country, and industry at
the 2-digit NACE level. In col (1), the matching is based on the \All rms" sample; in col (2) it is based on the
\Large rms" sample. sd is the standard deviation of growth of the rm outcome over 2002{06. The explanatory
variables are for 2002. In the lower panel, we estimate our main OLS specication using the matched sample. Foreign
Ownership denotes the percent ownership share that belongs to foreigners. Largest Owner is Foreign is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if the largest owner of a given rm is a foreigner. Foreign Minority Ownership
denotes the remaining percent ownership share that belongs to foreigners after the share that belongs to the largest
owner is excluded; Domestic Minority Ownership is calculated similarly. Firm Age is the dierence between the
end year in our sample and the date of incorporation. Operating Revenue and Assets are in 2005 constant euros.
Industry-xed eects at the 2-digit NACE level. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.Table 5: Changes in Firm-Level Volatility and Lagged Ownership
Sample: Permanent rms, 2002{2006
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Change
in Log Volatility of Firm Outcome
Volatility Measure sd cv
Firm Outcome Operating Revenue Operating Revenue
Firms Included All All
Lagged Largest Owner is Foreign .056* .051*
(.030) (.031)
Log Lagged Foreign Minority Ownership .006 {.001
(.026) (.024)
Log Lagged Domestic Minority Ownership .004 {.001
(.003) (.003)
Log Lagged Total Assets {.014 .003y
(.002) (.002)
Firm Age .001*** .001*
(.000) (.000)
Country Fixed E. yes yes
Industry Fixed E. yes yes
Firms 296,515 296,513
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the rm level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, * and
y denote signicance
at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, resp. The \Permanent rms" sample is composed of rms with non-missing outcomes
in every year between 2002{2006. Changes in volatility are computed between 2005{06 and 2003{04. The explanatory
variables are for 2002. Log Foreign Ownership denotes the logarithm of 1+percent ownership share belonging to
foreigners. Largest Owner is Foreign is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the largest owner is foreign.
Log Foreign Minority Ownership denotes the logarithm of 1+the percent ownership belonging to foreigners after
the share of the largest owner is excluded; Domestic Minority Ownership is calculated similarly. Firm Age is the
dierence between the end year in our sample and the date of incorporation. Operating Revenue and Assets are in
2005 constant euros. Industry-xed eects at the 2-digit NACE level. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.
49Table 6: Firm-Level Volatility and Foreign Ownership: Dynamics
Sample: Permanent rms, 2000{2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: Log Volatility of Firm Outcome
Volatility Measure Time-varying std. dev. of rm outcome growth, sdt
Firm Outcome Operating Revenue
Largest Owner is Foreign .207*** .188*** .028**
(.007) (.007) (.014)
Log Foreign Minority Ownership .009 .017*** .006
(.007) (.007) (.010)
Log Domestic Minority Ownership .021*** {.010*** {.001
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Log Foreign Ownership .009*** .007** .014***
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Log Number of Domestic Owners {.010* {.014** {.011*
(.006) (.006) (.006)
Log Number of Foreign Owners {.011 {.047***
(.013) (.017)
Log Total Assets {.077*** {.080*** {.023*** {.024*** {.023*** {.023*** {.023***
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002)
Firm Fixed E. no no yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed E. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
CountryYear Fixed E. no yes yes yes yes yes yes
IndustryYear Fixed E. no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,262,723 2,235,264 2,235,264 2,235,264 2,235,264 2,235,264 2,235,264
Firms 763,360 754,126 754,126 754,126 754,126 754,126 754,126
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the rm level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, and
y denote signicance
at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, resp. The \Permanent rms" sample excludes all rms with missing outcomes in any
year of the specied period; however, many rms have missing ownership information in one or more years, making
the estimation panel unbalanced. sdt is the time-varying volatility measure based on rm outcome growth as in
Eq. (1). Log Foreign Ownership denotes the logarithm of 1+the percent ownership share that belongs to foreigners.
Largest Owner is Foreign is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the largest owner is foreign. Log Foreign
Minority Ownership denotes the logarithm of 1+the percent ownership share belonging to foreigners after the share
of the largest owner is excluded; Domestic Minority Ownership is calculated similarly. Number of Owners give the
number of foreign and domestic owners, respectively. Firm Age is the dierence between the end year in our sample
and the date of incorporation. Operating Revenue and Assets are in 2005 constant euros. Industry-xed eects at
the 2-digit NACE level. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.
50Table 7: Regional Volatility and Financial Integration: Typical Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Log Median Volatility
Volatility Measure Time-varying std. dev. of regional outcome growth, sdt
Firm Outcome Sales Operating Sales Operating
Revenue Revenue
Panel A: Eects of Foreign Ownership
Log Financial Integration .020 .022* .034* .030*
(.021) (.013) (.020) (.017)
Log Region Total Assets .212*** .140** .010 .022
(.079) (.070) (.092) (.084)
Panel B: Eects of Majority/Minority Foreign Ownership
Log Financial Integration .024 .013 .059** .038*
(Majority Owners) (.024) (.017) (.029) (.021)
Log Financial Integration {.030* {.002 {.027 .013
(Minority Owners) (.017) (.025) (.029) (.039)
Log Financial Integration .029* .007 .009 .020*
(Domestic) (.015) (.008) (.013) (.011)
Log Region Total Assets 0.199*** 0.133* .006 .029
(.078) (.069) (.090) (.078)
Region Fixed E. yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed E. yes yes yes yes
CountryYear Fixed E. no no yes yes
Observations 248 368 248 368
Regions 62 92 62 92
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the region level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, and
y denote
signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%,and 15% levels, resp. Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, and Norway rms and hence
regions have no data for sales. See appendix B for the excluded outlier regions. sdt is a time-varying volatility
measure based on rm outcome growth as in Eq. (1). Log Financial Integration (Total) is the logarithm of 1+the
weighted average of rm-level foreign ownership percentages within a given region using rm assets as weights. Log
Financial Integration (Majority Owners) represents the logarithm of 1+the percentage share of total assets of all
rms whose largest owner is foreign in a given region. Log Financial Integration (Minority Owners) is the logarithm
of 1+the weighted average of rm-level foreign Minority Ownership percentages using rm assets as weights; regional
Financial Integration (Domestic) is calculated similarly from rm-level domestic Minority Ownership percentages.
Region Total Assets is the sum of total assets of rms within a given region. Sales, Operating Revenue, and Assets
are all in 2005 constant euros. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.
51Table 8: Regional Volatility and Financial Integration: Aggregation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Log Volatility of
Aggregated Firm Outcome or Regional GDP
Volatility Measure Time-varying std. dev. of regional outcome growth, sdt
Aggregated Firm Outcome Sales Operating Sales Operating
Revenue Revenue
Regional Outcome Regional GDP
per capita
Log Financial Integration .635** .649** .681** .862*** .603*** .573*
(.318) (.305) (.321) (.259) (.246) (.304)
Log Region Total Assets {.187 1.01 {.880 {.124
(1.92) (1.65) (2.14) (1.66)
Log Population {20.4*** {18.2***
(6.08) (6.19)
Region Fixed E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
CountryYear Fixed E. no no yes yes no yes
Observations 186 276 186 276 255 255
Regions 62 92 62 92 85 85
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the region level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, and
y denote
signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%, resp. sdt is a time-varying volatility measure based on rm outcome growth
as in Eq. (1). Log Financial Integration (Total) is the logarithm of 1+the weighted average of rm-level foreign
ownership percentages within a given region using rm assets as the weights. Log Financial Integration (Majority
Owners) is the logarithm of 1+the percentage share of total assets of all rms whose largest owner is foreign in a
given region. Log Financial Integration (Minority Owners) is the logarithm of 1+the weighted average of the rm-
level foreign Minority Ownership percentages using rm assets as weights; Log Financial Integration (Domestic) is
calculated similarly from rm-level domestic Minority Ownership percentages. Region Total Assets is the sum of
total assets of rms within a given region. Sales, Operating Revenue, and Assets are all in 2005 constant euros. See
Appendix B for detailed explanations. Population data are from Eurostat.Table 9: Regional Volatility and Financial Integration: Reduced Form Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Log Volatility of Regional GDP per Capita
Volatility Measure Time-varying std. dev. of growth of operating revenue, sdt
Social Capital Measure Trust in People General Level of Trust Trust in Institutions
(Social Capital  1.69** 2.08** 1.88*
Financial Harmonization) (.731) (.980) (1.12)
Log Population {23.4*** {24.8*** {23.4***
(6.15) (6.45) (6.77)
Region Fixed E. yes yes yes
Year Fixed E. yes yes yes
CountryYear Fixed E. yes yes yes
Observations 255 255 255
Regions 85 85 85
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the region level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, and
y denote
signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%, resp. sdt is a time-varying volatility measure based on rm growth of
operating revenue as in Eq. (1). The Financial Harmonization Index is the sum of indicator variables which take
the value of one for each law when the law is adopted. Each column uses a dierent trust variable to measure social
capital. Population data are from Eurostat. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.
53Table 10: Regional Volatility and Financial Integration: IV Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Second Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Log Volatility of the Regional GDP per capita
Volatility Measure Time-varying std. dev. of outcome growth, sdt
Log Financial Integration 2.44* 2.39* 1.97y
(1.34) (1.28) (1.33)
Log Population {19.9** {19.8** {19.4**
(8.77) (8.72) (8.39)
Panel B: First Stage Regression
Dependent variable: Log Financial Integration (Total)
Trust in Other People  .692***
Financial Harmonization (.212)
General Level of Trust  .871***
Financial Harmonization (.256)
Trust in Institutions  .954***
Financial Harmonization (.305)
Log Population {1.45 {2.06 {2.01
(2.12) (2.17) (2.20)
F stats for excluded inst. 10.68 11.58 9.81
p value 0.001 0.001 0.002
Region Fixed E. yes yes yes
Year Fixed E. yes yes yes
CountryYear Fixed E. yes yes yes
Observations 255 255 255
Regions 85 85 85
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the region level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, and
y denote
signicance at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%, resp. sdt is a time-varying volatility measure based on rm outcome growth
as in Eq. (1). Log Financial Integration (Total) is the logarithm of 1+the weighted average of rm-level foreign
ownership percentages within a given region using rm assets as weights. The Financial Harmonization Index is
the sum of indicator variables that takes the value of one for each law when the law is adopted. We use laws from
the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the EU. Each column uses a dierent trust variable to measure social
capital. Population data are from Eurostat. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.Table 11: Firm-Level Volatility and Foreign Ownership: 25 EU Countries
Sample: All rms, 2002{2006
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Log Volatility of rm outcome
Volatility Measure Std. dev. of rm outcome growth, sd
Firm Outcome Sales Operating Employment
Revenue
Largest Owner is Foreign .194*** .169*** .009
(.009) (.008) (.007)
Log Foreign Minority Ownership .024*** .034*** {.001
(.006) (.006) (.006)
Log Domestic Minority Ownership {.013*** {.019*** {.020***
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Log Total Assets {.051*** {.053*** {.176***
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Firm Age {.018*** {.017*** {.012***
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Country Fixed E. yes yes yes
Industry Fixed E. yes yes yes
Firms 1,116,248 1,443,445 767,304
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the rm level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, * and
y denote signicance
at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, resp. Firms in Slovenia are excluded due to missing age data while employment
data are missing for Cyprus. sd is the standard deviation of growth of rm outcome 2002{2006. The explanatory
variables are for 2002. Largest Owner is Foreign is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the largest owner is a
foreigner. Log Foreign Minority Ownership is the logarithm of 1+the percent ownership share belonging to foreigners
after the share of the largest owner is excluded; Domestic Minority Ownership is calculated similarly. Firm Age is the
dierence between the end year in our sample and the date of incorporation. Sales, Operating Revenue, and Assets
are all in 2005 constant euros. Employment is the number of full-time employees of the rm. Industry-xed eects
at the 2-digit NACE level. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.
55Table 12: Correlations of Financial Integration Measures: AMADEUS versus Country (LM) Data
Financial Integration (Total), AMADEUS
Panel A: Correlations over all Countries in 2006
Financial Integration, LM
FDI Liability 0.28
FDI and Portfolio Equity Liability 0.80
Total Assets and Liabilities 0.80
Panel B: Correlations Over Time
for Selected Countries, 2000{2006
Countries BE DE DK NL FR GB PT AT
Financial Integration (LM)
FDI Liability 0.90 0.72 0.70 0.41 0.39 0.76 0.76 0.65
FDI and Portfolio Equity Liability 0.90 0.45 0.19 0.64 0.02 0.30 0.84 0.62
Total Assets and Liabilities 0.91 0.80 0.55 0.96 0.54 0.86 0.86 0.76
Notes: The table reports the correlations between Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (LM) and AMADEUS nancial integration measures.
We calculate the country-level integration measures from AMADEUS data as the asset weighted average of rm-level foreign
ownership in a similar fashion to the regional measures. Country total assets is the sum of total assets of rms within a given
country. Financial integration from calculated from the LM data is based on dierent type of capital 
ows: FDI Liability
represents the stock of FDI external liabilities relative to GDP; FDI and Equity Liability is the sum of foreign direct and
portfolio equity investment liabilities relative to GDP; Gross Assets and Liabilities is the sum of the absolute value of external
assets and liabilities of FDI, portfolio equity, debt, and nancial derivative investments to GDP.
56A Robustness
Table A-1: Firm-Level Volatility and Foreign Ownership: Robustness I
Sample: All rms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Log Volatility of Firm Outcome
Volatility Measure Std. dev. of rm outcome growth, sd
Firm Outcome Operating Operating Sales Operating Employment
Revenue Revenue Revenue
Time Period 2000{2006 2004{2006 2002{2006 2002{2006 2002{2006
Largest Owner is Foreign .229*** .169*** .199*** .178*** .042***
(.009) (.008) (.010) (.008) (.008)
Log Foreign Minority Ownership .043*** .029*** .029*** .029*** {.009
(.006) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008)
Log Domestic Minority Ownership {.017*** {.016*** {.008*** {.016*** {.013***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Log Total Assets {.048*** {.076*** {.072*** {.068*** {.188***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Firm Age {.015*** {.013*** {.009*** {.008*** {.006***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Average Outcome Growth Rate 1.203*** 1.075*** 1.574***
(.010) (.006) (.009)
Country Fixed E. yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Fixed E. yes yes yes yes yes
Firms 1,089,699 1,313,726 760,260 1,047,463 577,196
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the rm level and reported in parentheses. *** , **, * and
y denote signicance
at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, resp. sd is the standard deviation of growth of rm outcome, estimated over the
stated period. The explanatory variables are for the rst year of the stated period. Largest Owner is Foreign is
a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the largest owner of a given rm is a foreigner. Foreign Minority
Ownership denotes the remaining percent ownership share that belongs to foreigners after the share that belongs
to the largest owner is excluded; Domestic Minority Ownership is calculated similarly. Firm Age is the dierence
between the end year in our sample and the date of incorporation. Sales, Operating Revenue, and Assets are all in














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































58B Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table B-1: Number of Firms by Country: Raw and Merged Data
Country Firm-Level Var. 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Per 10,000 of
population
2006
AT Total Assets 26 53 76 106 222 508 1298 34528 69273 77388 93
(raw) Operating Rev. 1 6 119 983 2527 2762 3
Ownership 5715 84314 104780 122988 148
AT Total Assets 12 28 37 50 116 299 785 24754 50454 56763 68
(merged) Operating Rev. 3 50 504 1402 1590 2
Ownership 1 12274 27995 50031 60
BE Total Assets 19561 80329 188445 210523 226870 243274 262668 281696 301652 282802 324790 308
(raw) Operating Rev. 8934 34200 76884 88393 90675 93291 96269 97313 99029 82637 85207 81
Ownership 9457 299840 320843 341000 324
BE Total Assets 17329 74152 175254 195704 211199 226730 245092 262641 279990 288193 295435 280
(merged) Operating Rev. 7668 30439 68146 78533 80311 82587 85169 85678 86551 78370 71117 67
Ownership 3943 223938 260080 278761 265
CH Total Assets 12 76 191 287 352 398 443 545 581 626 629 1
(raw) Operating Rev. 17 88 209 304 373 417 457 558 593 650 638 1
Ownership 2390 29346 32609 31886 42
CH Total Assets 10 49 136 196 234 267 301 355 370 380 373 <1
(merged) Operating Rev. 14 59 151 211 251 283 314 368 380 397 380 1
Ownership 12 244 334 372 <1
DE Total Assets 57 137 386 1872 4407 10874 21695 50517 93960 215026 280720 34
(raw) Operating Rev. 54 133 373 1746 3838 9293 18335 35084 53184 62894 46436 6
Ownership 48371 494703 797281 833243 101
DE Total Assets 20 52 159 827 2187 5970 12624 32646 63710 151406 197879 24
(merged) Operating Rev. 19 48 148 735 1775 4693 9797 19394 29565 34099 25866 3
Ownership 751 9173 59436 193244 23
DK* Total Assets 1 6 16 100 3343 7517 26353 114694 131993 144309 160818 296
(raw) Operating Rev. 3 8 40 908 1935 7621 32562 35580 35721 33781 62
Ownership 3167 112711 141766 167228 308
DK* Total Assets 3 14 89 3124 6996 24776 108337 123638 135398 147138 271
(merged) Operating Rev. 2 7 34 832 1759 7035 30161 32509 32512 30027 55
Ownership 71 21700 110046 131839 242
ES Total Assets 72733 198713 245443 289772 333638 434360 533227 620388 709507 732724 623275 141
(raw) Operating Rev. 67636 191224 233847 274789 315232 409187 493715 564530 637882 661790 570485 129
Ownership 16545 407895 683643 858303 195
ES Total Assets 52628 156820 193230 228461 263744 347457 411669 450400 474353 467671 405212 92
(merged) Operating Rev. 49423 152119 185461 218045 250442 328336 384087 416854 438706 436338 381171 86
Ownership 9086 217017 391136 401910 91
FI Total Assets 1962 12305 33095 39572 43213 46984 51788 58813 63819 70704 76001 144
(raw) Operating Rev. 1900 12009 32354 38697 42214 45714 50079 56445 61015 67210 72167 137
Ownership 3071 63913 71412 84355 160
FI Total Assets 1256 8198 22727 27345 29960 32813 36374 41339 44732 48103 51400 98
(merged) Operating Rev. 1219 8009 22255 26789 29318 31973 35150 39641 42722 45835 48816 93
Ownership 1041 27080 33200 44424 84
FR Total Assets 337874 472885 513170 564313 624135 685484 775205 840977 872235 138
(raw) Operating Rev. 325277 456359 494303 542249 598333 655912 739707 799939 828422 131
Ownership 28988 848405 910559 974227 154
FR Total Assets 222695 313825 342374 379132 422486 464933 521232 555990 566987 90
(merged) Operating Rev. 213141 301094 327627 361597 401913 441408 493838 526195 537146 85
Ownership 10929 362572 453597 521021 82
GB* Total Assets 22494 88888 336280 625526 743161 849593 968352 1151118 1448453 1559654 1659400 274
(raw) Operating Rev. 8874 35975 115921 188954 211336 227614 245922 273265 332544 329056 333728 55
Ownership 26240 1211150 1631909 1994926 329
GB* Total Assets 18710 75250 268558 452543 518870 576725 642494 751083 895441 953103 1004915 166
(merged) Operating Rev. 7128 29418 94863 150048 164422 174355 185530 203572 226461 225659 221189 37
Ownership 16770 548718 782685 931759 154
GR Total Assets 875 3558 13459 14856 16525 18176 19965 22197 24249 25911 26311 24
(raw) Operating Rev. 851 3490 13156 14559 16191 17814 19476 21677 23766 25295 25702 23
Ownership 2345 23850 26965 28073 25
GR Total Assets 677 2860 11255 12383 13639 14905 16174 17719 18897 19819 20174 18
(merged) Operating Rev. 665 2816 11066 12192 13430 14671 15860 17398 18629 19497 19880 18
Ownership 1293 13048 16328 18038 16
IE* Total Assets 6808 12850 16346 38180 63029 75918 85583 94871 105584 108743 108440 255
(raw) Operating Rev. 369 639 791 2104 4317 6007 6799 7621 9006 10728 10775 25
Ownership 775 24362 117072 141005 332
IE* Total Assets 6235 11882 14860 32100 51181 60245 66334 71808 77933 78206 75186 177
(merged) Operating Rev. 313 540 670 1747 3484 4901 5438 5951 6982 8117 7955 19
Ownership 348 16548 69032 73188 172
(Continued on next page)
59Table B-1: (Continued) Number of Firms by Country: Raw and Merged Data
Country Firm-Level Var. 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Per 10,000 of
population
2006
IT Total Assets 22160 54489 93967 110900 125013 143883 231230 226458 520281 543467 554622 94
(raw) Operating Rev. 21909 54152 93340 110055 123685 141370 227546 221807 509651 533243 544656 92
Ownership 21275 175263 273522 612954 104
IT Total Assets 7533 19359 35801 43054 49366 59277 105778 102160 242833 272205 279504 47
(merged) Operating Rev. 7444 19270 35597 42747 48915 58042 104110 99957 238598 268453 274126 47
Ownership 4984 44604 103676 267034 45
NL Total Assets 50801 85201 97370 104501 113204 132875 202376 240828 279993 274051 258171 158
(raw) Operating Rev. 1186 1994 2561 2849 3040 4180 6227 7144 8247 8267 7022 4
Ownership 6237 208977 305552 353143 216
NL Total Assets 46117 79882 92032 99394 107286 125336 189749 215482 234955 223100 207289 127
(merged) Operating Rev. 817 1343 1717 1897 2031 2884 4316 4597 4879 4641 3906 2
Ownership 1504 107893 202576 200893 123
NO* Total Assets 5995 47706 85587 93949 104125 113251 122785 132336 144430 158112 182457 392
(raw) Operating Rev. 5248 42351 76037 82720 90761 98055 105845 114061 123430 128826 138531 298
Ownership 3776 129933 165992 189868 408
NO* Total Assets 4775 40739 74339 81429 90037 98022 106345 114808 124337 137486 143781 309
(merged) Operating Rev. 4278 36940 67232 72989 79925 86264 93218 100585 107996 113314 115448 248
Ownership 2334 96648 113299 130846 281
PT Total Assets 13148 17748 20054 31368 35424 33564 47322 69054 77966 271040 287698 272
(raw) Operating Rev. 12444 16799 19067 29620 33348 31853 44940 65467 73127 245844 258535 244
Ownership 2043 43292 69333 90155 85
PT Total Assets 4056 5696 7805 12809 16612 18452 26952 36373 34996 47458 46440 44
(clean) Operating Rev. 3882 5440 7425 12077 15469 17260 25311 34239 32766 44316 43305 41
Ownership 529 9587 18028 45361 43
SE Total Assets 487 35243 145459 156686 167357 179121 190538 201805 216114 231682 249319 275
(raw) Operating Rev. 24734 136694 147072 156429 165855 174998 184657 195918 207929 221725 245
Ownership 8571 240415 231389 242834 268
SE Total Assets 347 23616 106586 115048 123294 132960 142018 151122 162610 175507 187688 207
(merged) Operating Rev. 16784 99916 107588 114811 122598 130062 138059 147525 158019 167873 185
Ownership 4343 133308 143506 167198 184
TOTAL Total Assets 217094 637275 1614025 2191053 2492937 2854323 3388968 3952102 4928315 5556291 5742274 143
(raw) Operating Rev. 129422 417791 1126519 1438261 1586650 1794835 2096568 2338222 2903662 3210373 3180572 79
Ownership 188966 4398369 5884627 7066188 176
TOTAL Total Assets 159693 498570 1225479 1615244 1823157 2085403 2449465 2821991 3324781 3604479 3686164 92
(merged) Operating Rev. 82870 303227 807795 1026726 1133043 1292203 1487313 1637912 1908611 1997164 1949795 48
Ownership 57939 1844352 2784954 3455919 86
Notes: \Raw," data are the number of rms with non-missing data as available in the original data source. \Merged," data
show the number of rms with non-missing data after we merge ownership data with nancial data and apply our sample
selection criteria as discussed in detail in Appendix B. The column marked \Per 10,000 of population 2006" reports the number
of rms in 2006 reporting year in AMADEUS per 10 thousand of the country population in 2006.
*Firms in countries marked with asterisk do not have sales data in AMADEUS. The country name abbreviations denote
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT),
Netherlands (NL), Norway(NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), and the United Kingdom (GB).
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Log Average Openness from LM over 1995-2005
Samples Legend:
Black solid: EU-25 w/o Luxembourg
Red short dash: EU-15 w/o Luxembourg
Black long dash: EU-25 w/o Luxembourg, Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus


































hFigure 2: Financial Integration in Europe, 1990{2006
Panel A: Sum of foreign labilities of 16 European countries



















































































































































































Panel B: Foreign liability components


















































































Notes: Based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The total foreign liability stocks is the sum of FDI, portfolio equity,
and debt liabilites. The 16 countries included are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































64Figure 5: Distribution of Firm-Level Volatility
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































69Figure 10: Distribution of Ownership in 2006 for Two Regions
Foreign Ownership
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70Figure 11: Distribution of the Propensity Scores for Matched and Unmatched Firms
A: Firms in the Matched Sample
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Propensity Scores, Unmatched Domestic Firms
Notes: In Panel A the distribution of the propensity scores is for 24,697 rms with non-zero foreign ownership (left
graph) and 24,697 rms with zero foreign ownership (right graph) making up the matched sample. In Panel B, the
distribution of the propensity scores is for 998,069 unmatched domestic rms. Matching is performed on rm age, total
assets, country- and industry-dummies at the 2-digit NACE level. The propensity scores are the estimated (logistic)
probabilities of being foreign-owned conditional on these variables. See Appendix B for detailed explanations.
71Figure 12: Dynamics of Aggregate Volatility
Volatility of Aggregated
Firm Revenue Growth
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Notes: Cross-sectional average of the time-varying volatility measure, see Equation (1), calculated for aggregated
operating revenue from AMADUES (upper line) or regional per capita GDP from Eurostat. The vertical lines show
+/{ one standard deviation.
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Instrument
Notes: Plot of conditional correlation of Financial Integration and the instrument (Trust  Financial Harmonization
Laws) form the rst-stage regression in column (1) of Table 10. The regression line (solid) has a coecient of 0.69
(signicant at the 1% level) while the shaded area represents the 95% condence interval. The dashed regression line
drops the outliers Luxembourg/Belgium (BE34) and Picardie (FR22) and has a coecient of 0.43 (signicant at the
2% level).
73Figure 14: Distribution of Firm Assets in AMADEUS by Availability of Ownership Data, 2006
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